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VOLUME 56 WINTER 1982 NUMBER 2
A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
DISPOSITION UPON DIVORCE IN THE
TRISTATE AREA
Louis M. J. DILEo*
ERIC L. MODEL**
During the past 20 years, our society has witnessed profound
changes in its most cherished values and institutions. Foremost
among these changes is the recent explosion in the divorce rate.
Once considered socially unacceptable, marital dissolution invaria-
bly has touched almost every American family. The legal system,
however, has responded slowly to this emerging social reality.
Prior to the enactment of their respective equitable distribu-
tion laws,' New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut viewed divorce
* Law Clerk to Hon. William J. McCloud, Superior Court of New Jersey; A.B., Rutgers
College, 1975; J.D., University of Arkansas, 1980.
** Law Clerk to Hon. Robert J. T. Mooney, J.J.D.R.C. t/a Superior Court of New
Jersey; B.A., Hobart College, 1976; J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law, 1979.
' Equitable distribution is the apportionment of marital assets between a divorcing
husband and wife irrespective of individual ownership. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 209,
213, 320 A.2d 484, 490, 493 (1974); Comment, Divorce Law-Equitable Distribution of
Property in New Jersey, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 447 (1974). The policy underlying equita-
ble distribution is that "[t]he distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage
should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the disso-
lution of a partnership." UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, Commissioner's Prefa-
tory Note 93 (1973). Statutory embodiments of equitable distribution principles have with-
stood constitutional challenges premised on undue vagueness, Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. at
211, 320 A.2d at 492, and the impairment of contractual rights. Valladares v. Valladares, 80
App. Div. 2d 244, 253, 438 N.Y.S.2d 810, 816 (2d Dep't 1981), aff'd, No. 134 (N.Y. Ct. App.
April 6, 1982). Forty states, including the District of Columbia, have adopted some form of
equitable distribution. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.210(6) (1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-
1214 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (1973 & Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-81(a) (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a) (1981); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-910(b)
(West Supp. 1978-1979); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 580-47(a) (Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
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from the restrictive common-law perspective.2 The financial con-
test usually was decided upon the merits of the divorce action. Ali-
mony could not be awarded to a spouse who had been guilty of
§ 503(c) (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. §
598.21 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(c) (Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190(1)
(Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722A(1) (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208,
§ 34 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.23(1) (Supp. 1981-1982); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452-330.1 (Vernon Supp. 1982); MOT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 48-321(1) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1978); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1981-1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(c) (1979); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 23-401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (Supp.
1981) (reenactment); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-825
(1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (1974); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1977); Freed & Foster, Divorce in
the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229, 249-50 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Freed &
Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States]. Both equitable distribution and community property
systems are premised upon the idea of collective ownership of marital property. This con-
cept can be traced to the early Germanic tribes which established such a system in Spain. In
turn, the Spanish implemented community property systems in their new world colonies.
See Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common
Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of
the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71, 73-76
(1979). Eight states currently employ principles of community property which stem from
their colonial heritages. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1976); CAL. CIv. CODE § 5104
(West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Supp. 1981); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2335 (West Supp.
1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8B (1978); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1981). Mis-
sissippi, Virginia, and West Virginia, however, remain "title" jurisdictions. Freed & Foster,
Divorce in the Fifty States, supra, at 249-50.
2 Equitable distribution and the community property systems represent reactions
against the common law under which the courts played a limited role in dividing marital
property upon divorce. Under the common law, the only "divorce" available was the
equivalent of a contemporary legal separation. Since the marriage remained legally intact,
the spouses' respective property interests remained inviolate. See generally Comment,
supra note 1, at 448-51. Thus, the title issue was dispositive. New York courts were power-
less to transfer property to which one spouse held title unless the spouse seeking apportion-
ment satisfied the requirements for the imposition of a constructive trust. Fischer v. Wirth,
38 App. Div. 2d 611, 611-12, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309-10 (3d Dep't 1971) (absent fraud or
concealment, wife denied share in husband's property purchased with their combined sav-
ings over 22 years); see note 6 infra. See generally Foster & Freed, Marital Property and
the Chancellor's Foot, 10 FAM. L.Q. 55, 59-71 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Foster & Freed,
Marital Property]. Connecticut also used the strained artifice of a constructive trust to dis-
tribute marital property. E.g., Pappas v. Pappas, 164 Conn. 242, 320 A.2d 809, 810 (1973);
Manyak v. Manyak, 29 Conn. Supp. 1, 268 A.2d 806, 808 (Super. Ct. 1970). Courts in New
Jersey were inactive in distributing property because their jurisdiction was limited statuto-
rily to periodic awards of alimony, modification of alimony awards, and the enforcement of
private settlements which did not conflict with public policy. See, e.g., Polyckronos v.
Polyckronos, 17 N.J. Misc. 250, 256-59, 8 A.2d 265, 270-72 (Ch. 1939); Calame v. Calame, 25
N.J. Eq. 548, 549-51 (Ct. Err. & App. 1874).
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marital fault and, if both parties were guilty of such fault, neither
one would be eligible for an award of alimony.3 Additionally, be-
cause the authority of the judiciary was limited to the resolution of
title disputes, courts could not invade the assets of either party or
convey separate property.4
The resulting hardships led to a general consensus regarding
the necessity for reform.5 Against this background, the states in
the metropolitan area individually attempted to modernize their
approach to divorce and the attendant disposition of marital prop-
erty.6 Although the reformers spoke of marriage in terms of an eco-
I See note 155 and accompanying text infra.
See note 2 supra.
5 Fischer v. Wirth, 38 App. Div. 2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (3d Dep't 1971), vividly illus-
trates the harsh results engendered by the common-law rules. The wife in Wirth used her
salary to pay the family expenses for 22 years while her husband enriched himself by invest-
ing his accumulated earnings in his own name. Id. at 612, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 310. Upon disso-
lution of the marriage, the wife petitioned the court for the imposition of a constructive
trust. Id. at 611-12, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 309-10. Despite her husband's statement that he had
started a savings program "for the two of us," the court held that he had not impliedly
promised to reimburse his wife for the money she expended in fulfillment of his support
obligation. Id. at 612, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 310. The court emphasized that:
A constructive trust is a vehicle for "fraud rectifying." There may be a moral judg-
ment that can be made on the basis of respondent's conduct and the imperfectly
expressed intention of some possible future benefit to appellant, but that is not
enough to set the court in motion.
Id. at 612, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 311 (citations omitted).
' The New York Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Laws issued
a report in 1966 urging an extensive study of the state's alimony laws. This study was pre-
empted by passage of the Divorce Reform Law of 1966, ch. 254, § 2, [1966] N.Y. Laws 834
(current version at N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1977)), which established several
novel grounds for divorce. Although the new law represented the first change in the New
York divorce law since the abolition of legislative divorce in 1846, it did not alter the ex-
isting standards for distributing property or awarding alimony. See Foster & Freed, Marital
Property Reform in New York: Partnership of Co-Equals?, 8 F^m. L.Q. 169, 169-70 & nn.1-2
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Foster & Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York]. Profes-
sor Foster, an advisor to the committee which drafted the divorce reform legislation, pro-
duced an initial draft of the equitable distribution law during the early seventies. Ulti-
mately, this draft received the approval of various New York bar groups. See generally
Foster, Legislative History, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK EQUITABLE DisTIBu-
TION DIVORCE LAW 41 (H. Foster ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE TO NEW YORK EQUITA-
BLE DISTRIBUTION]; Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1, 1 n.1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution]. Ini-
tially introduced in the Senate in 1976, the bill stalled in the Senate Judiciary Committee
for 3 years because of fears that liberal reform would encourage divorces. The bill was rein-
troduced in 1980 by Senator Barclay and Assemblyman Burrows, N.Y.S. 6174, N.Y.A. 6200,
203 Sess. (1980). The legislation finally was enacted in June 1980. Ch. 281, § 9, [1980] N.Y.
Laws 1227 (current version at N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)).
New Jersey initiated reform in 1967 when its legislature appointed a commission to
study the divorce law. Ch. 57, [1967] N.J. Laws. This commission proposed a bill which was
1982]
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nomic partnership, the resulting laws implicitly rejected the notion
that marriage inevitably is a partnership of economic equals in
favor of an equitable distribution of marital property.7 Addition-
ally, the new laws provide that, where appropriate, temporary or
introduced in the Assembly in 1970. N.J.A. 1100, 194th Sess. (1970). The bill was enacted in
1971, marking the first major substantive change in the New Jersey divorce law in nearly
half a century. Ch. 212, § 8, [1971] N.J. LAWS 1025 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
Connecticut also moved toward divorce reform in 1967. In that year, the Family Law
Committee of the Connecticut Bar Association began a study of Connecticut divorce law
which culminated in a proposed bill which was submitted to the legislature in 1971. Propo-
sal for Revision of the Connecticut Statutes Relative to Divorce: Statute and Commentary,
44 CONN. B.J. 411 (1970). The committee proposal formed the basis for the legislation that
was enacted 2 years later. 1973 Conn. Pub. Acts 73-373 § 20 (current version at CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b-81 (1981)). For a critique of the initial proposal, see Cohen, Divorce Reform:
Another Point of View, 47 CONN. B.J. 88 (1973).
7 The New York Senate debated whether to adopt an amendment proposed by Senator
Winikow. Supported by the National Organization of Women, the amendment contained a
presumption that marital property should be divided equally upon divorce. The proposed
amendment was grounded on the principle that "marriage is what most people were led to
believe it to be, an equal partnership, and that equality is equity most of the time." Sas-
sower, Looking Anew for Fair Divorce Law, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1980, § 22, at 18, col. 2.
The debate was heated, with proponents of the amendment willing to postpone reform for
yet another year rather than pass an equitable distribution bill. See Record, New York
State Senate, at 3997 (June 3, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Winikow). Opponents of the amend-
ment, however, maintained that the unique nature of each marital relationship necessitated
flexibility in the disposition of property. Id. at 4061 (remarks of Sen. Goodhue). Indeed, one
opponent remarked that "[i]f there was no difference in the various marriages around this
state, then we should have equal distribution, but I suggest to you that there are no two
marriages alike." Id. Critics of the equitable distribution bill countered that "flexibility"
and its concomitant subjectivity would lead to unfair results with an overwhelmingly male
judiciary undervaluing wives' roles as homemakers. Sassower, supra, at 18, col. 2. Eventu-
ally, the amendment was defeated by a vote of 30 to 21 in the New York Senate. See Re-
cord, New York State Senate (June 3, 1980).
New Jersey and Connecticut also have rejected the view that marriage always is an
equal economic partnership. Any doubts concerning whether the 1971 revisions in the New
Jersey divorce law incorporated the idea that marriage is an equal partnership were resolved
by the first definitive judicial interpretation of the new law. In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J.
196, 216-17, 320 A.2d 484, 495 (1974), the New Jersey Supreme Court noted:
[C]ommunity property law is very different from our law of property ... We
have no reason to suppose that the lawmakers intended to adopt a rule the devel-
opment and evolution of which would very likely come to be governed by rules of
community property law, or that they were aware they might be doing so.
Id.; cf. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232, 320 A.2d 496, 503 (1974) (each case should
be examined individually).
By providing for judicial assignment "to either the husband or wife all or any part of
the estate of the other," the Connecticut law emphasizes the potential for an unequal distri-
bution of property. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(a) (1981) (emphasis added). See also ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981).
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permanent periodic payments may be awarded to either spouse.8
Of the three states, New Jersey was the first to adopt equita-
ble distribution and was propelled into the forefront of subsequent
developments.9 Connecticut followed suit in 1974.10 New York's
statute became effective in July 1980, and consequently its param-
eters, to some degree, are undefined.11 While there are significant
' See notes 157-171 and accompanying text infra.
9 Ch. 212, § 8, 1971 N.J. Laws 1025 (currently codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West Supp. 1981-1982)). The statute provides:
In all actions where a judgment of divorce or divorce from bed and board is en-
tered the court may make such award or awards to the parties, in addition to
alimony and maintenance, to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property,
both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or
either of them during the marriage.
Id.
,0 1973 Conn. Pub. Acts 73-373, § 20 (currently codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81
(1981)). The statute provides:
At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal
separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b-45, the superior court may
assign to either the husband or wife all or part of the estate of the other. The
court may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may
order the sale of such real property, without any act by either the husband or the
wife, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree
into effect.
Id. § 46b-81(a).
Section 46b-81, which appeared as section 46-51 until its transfer in 1979, has been
amended twice. The language enabling the court to convey title to real property and specify-
ing that the conveyance would function as a deed, binding life estates and remainders, was
added in 1975. 1975 Conn. Pub. Acts 75-331. A 1978 amendment made nonsubstantive
changes in phraseology and divided the section into subsections. 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 78-
230, § 36.
C Oh. 281, § 9, [1980] N.Y. Laws 1227 (currently codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)). Section 236 directs the court to distribute marital property
equitably, considering both "the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties." Id.
§ 236(B)(5)(c). Subsection 236(B)(5)(d) outlines criteria to be considered in making the
award:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the
time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and
to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the mar-
riage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made
to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including
joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent,
wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other
party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
1982]
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differences among these jurisdictions in the application of equita-
ble distribution principles, the tristate practitioner now may ex-
pect a greater degree of uniformity in the division of marital assets
upon divorce. 12 This Article will examine the similarities and dif-
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any
interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of
retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by
the other party;
(10) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.
Id.
New York's equitable distribution statute became effective on July 19, 1980. The stat-
ute, by its own terms, does not apply to actions commenced prior to the effective date. N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); Goding v. Goding, 106 Misc. 2d 423,
426, 431 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980). But see Deschamps v. Des-
champs, 103 Misc. 2d 678, 684, 430 N.Y.S.2d 966, 969 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980) (sub-
division five of part B to be applied retroactively). Plaintiffs who had divorce actions pend-
ing on the effective date have sought to discontinue their actions with a view towards
commencing a new action which would be subject to the equitable distribution law. When
confronted with the issue, many courts have refused to grant leave to discontinue. E.g.,
Tucker v. Tucker, No. 135 (N.Y. Ct. App. April 6, 1982); Valladares v. Valladares, 80 App.
Div. 2d 244, 259, 438 N.Y.S.2d 810, 820 (2d Dep't 1981), aff'd, No. 134 (N.Y. Ct. App. April
6, 1982); Gellman v. Gellman, 80 App. Div. 2d 735, 735, 437 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (4th Dep't
1981); Mazzei v. Mazzei, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1981, at 11, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County);
Mercier v. Mercier, 103 Misc. 2d 1029, 1035 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1980). Some courts
have found that granting a discontinuance would be contrary to the legislative intent. Moss
v. Moss, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 13, 1981, at 13, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Queens County); Goding v. Goding,
106 Misc. 2d 423, 427, 431 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980).
Conversely, several courts have granted motions to discontinue, adopting the view that
a discontinuance would not prejudice the defendant. Cooper v. Cooper, 103 Misc. 2d 689,
694-95, 430 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1001 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1980); accord, Zervalis v.
Zervalis, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 7, 1981, at 14, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County); Pollack v. Pollack,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1980, at 13, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County). In granting a discontinu-
ance, one court deemed it significant that the plaintiff was not seeking to harass the defen-
dant or relitigate any issue. Badeer v. Badeer, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 1980, at 15, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County).
For a discussion of the New York statute, see GuME TO N.w YORK EQurrTABLE DisTmBu-
TION, supra note 6; Foster & Freed, Family Law, 1980 Survey of New York Law, 32 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 335 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Foster & Freed, Family Law]; Shainswit, Some
Thoughts From the Bench On Equitable Distribution, N.Y.L.J., April 6, 1981, at 1, col. 2;
Riebesehl, Equitable-Distribution Law: Inequity in Dividing Property, N.Y.L.J., March 23,
1981, at 1, col. 2; Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47
BROOKLYN L. REV. 67 (1980); 45 ALE. L. Rnv. 483 (1981).
12 Although the tristate practitioner now may anticipate a greater degree of uniformity,
significant differences will continue to exist. For example, the statutory equitable distribu-
tion schemes diverge in their initial determinations of the property subject to distribution.
See notes 13-32 and accompanying text infra. Furthermore, section 307 of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act originally required an assignment of each spouse's property to
that spouse and a subsequent division of the marital property. Property acquired by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent and any increase in value of property acquired before the mar-
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ferences in the law of equitable distribution in the New York met-
ropolitan area.
DETERMINING ASSETS SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
In arriving at an equitable distribution, a court initially must
determine which assets are subject to distribution.13 New York and
New Jersey distribute property acquired "during the marriage. 1' 4
riage was excepted from the marital property category. This approach was criticized by sev-
eral commentators. See, e.g., Proposed Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 7 FAM.
L.Q. 135, 151-52 (1973); Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act, 7 FAm. L.Q. 169, 175 (1973). Subsequently, in 1973, section 307 was amended to
encompass two alternative approaches. Alternative A provided for the equitable apportion-
ment of "property and estates belonging to either or both (spouse(s)], however and when-
ever acquired." Alternative B retained the distinction between community and separate
property. Alternative A, however, was recommended for adoption. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT § 307, Commissioner's Comment (1973).
"1 The process for determining which assets are subject to an equitable distribution was
delineated in Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974). The Rothman court
rejected any formalistic approach, declaring that the trial judge's determination should be
based upon an examination of each case "as an individual and particular entity." Id. at 232-
33 n.6, 320 A.2d at 503 n.6; Comment, supra note 1, at 461-62. Full cooperation is required
from the litigants to assist the trial judge in his determination. Each spouse must review all
of his eligible property beforehand and come into court fully prepared to testify accurately
respecting these assets. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. at 233, 320 A.2d at 504. This prepara-
tion normally will involve an expenditure of time and money in addition to the use, when
necessary, of appraisers and accountants. Id.
Compulsory financial disclosure is provided by statute in New York. N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 236(B)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Each party in litigation involving alimony,
maintenance, or support is required to submit a sworn statement of individual net worth.
Id. Failure to comply with subsection four of Part B is punishable by civil penalties. Id.
Subsection four enumerates the minimum disclosure requirements. Roussos v. Roussos, 106
Misc. 2d 583, 584, 434 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1980). Additional disclo-
sure may be mandated. Id.; see McKenzie v. McKenzie, 78 App. Div. 2d 585, 586, 432
N.Y.S.2d 424, 425 (4th Dep't 1980); Stolowitz v. Stolowitz, 106 Misc. 2d 853, 856, 435
N.Y.S.2d 882, 884-85 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980) (broad disclosure imperative for proper
equitable distribution trial). Notably, the only limitation which has been imposed upon this
policy of complete disclosure has involved attempts to discover the identity and addresses of
legal clients who are not parties to the matrimonial litigation. 106 Misc. 2d at 859, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 886-87. To facilitate the evaluation of pertinent financial information, several
courts have made pendente lite awards of monies to enable an unemployed spouse to retain
an accountant for the purpose of examining the financial condition of the supporting spouse.
Fay v. Fay, 108 Misc. 2d 373, 375, 437 N.Y.S.2d 601, 603 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1981);
Gueli v. Gueli, 106 Misc. 2d 877, 878-79, 435 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538-39 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1981).
" See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). As used in the New Jersey statute, the term
"during the marriage" clearly refers to the period commencing with the marriage ceremony.
See Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 217, 320 A.2d 484, 495 (1974). Because of the difficulty
inherent in determining precisely when a marriage dissolves, New Jersey courts have
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:219
The central inquiry under this standard is whether the assets in-
volved may properly be regarded as "marital" or "separate" prop-
erty.15 In making this determination, trial judges in the two states
are aided by established definitions of the terms "marital" and
"separate" property. These key terms are defined statutorily in
New York.' In New Jersey, however, the terms have been defined
judicially.
Painter v. Painter17 is the seminal case defining marital prop-
erty in New Jersey. In Painter, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that all property in which a spouse acquired an interest dur-
ing the marriage is eligible for distribution upon divorce regardless
of its original source."8 The court also enunciated what had been
the established definition of separate property, holding that prop-
erty owned by a spouse prior to the marriage-including any
adopted the date on which the divorce complaint is filed as the termination date. Id. at 218,
320 A.2d at 495. Although possibly inaccurate, this formulation was merely "an attempt to
avoid promulgating an unworkable rule." Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 360-61, 371 A.2d 1, 6-
7 (1977). If parties enter into a formal separation contract which is accompanied by an
actual separation, this date will serve as the termination date for equitable distribution pur-
poses. Id. at 361-62, 371 A.2d at 7.
New York has statutorily adopted the test enunciated by New Jersey courts, treating
the marriage as terminated once a separation agreement is executed or a matrimonial action
is commenced. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see Foster
& Freed, Family Law, supra note 11, at 341.
15 See notes 18-28 and accompanying text infra.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c)-(d) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
.7 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
18 Id. at 217, 320 A.2d at 495. The Painter court gave comprehensive construction to
the section allowing assets acquired by one spouse during the marriage to be distributed. Id.
at 216-17, 320 A.2d at 494-95. In construing the statutory term "acquired" to include either
spouse's receipt of title to property through "gift or inheritance or indeed any other way,"
the court expanded upon the trial court's construction, which limited marital property to
assets obtained through individual effort. Id. at 215, 329 A.2d at 494; Note, Painter v.
Painter: Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets Upon Divorce, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 397, 405
(1975). Moreover, the Painter court was motivated to adopt an inclusive definition of dis-
tributable assets in order to avoid following an established community property rule. 65 N.J.
at 215-16, 320 A.2d at 494. In community property jurisdictions, assets received during the
marriage by one spouse by gift, descent, or devise are considered separate property. Id. at
216, 320 A.2d at 494 (citing 4A R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 626, at 717 (rev. ed. 1973)). See
generally 1 W. DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 69, at 171-74 (1943). Not-
withstanding the differences between community property and equitable distribution princi-
ples, the court reasoned that the applicable community property rule probably would influ-
ence the subsequent development of the equitable distribution law. 65 N.J. at 216, 320 A.2d
at 494; see Comment, supra note 1, at 458. The court believed that the adoption of commu-
nity property law should not occur "unwittingly" and without legislative "study and deliber-
ation." 65 N.J. at 216-17, 320 A.2d at 495; see 79 DICK. L. REV. 526, 530 (1975). For a critical
analysis of the analogy to community gain principles, see Note, supra, at 411-12.
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postmarital increase in value-is excluded from any subsequent
equitable distribution.19 Recently, however, the New Jersey legisla-
ture redefined separate property to include assets acquired by be-
quest, devise, or descent, or by gift from someone other than the
spouse.20
Although the New York statute anticipated the change in the
New Jersey definition of separate property, it was guided, to some
extent, by the Painter definitions." The New York statute defines
marital property as all property acquired by either spouse during
the marriage, but before the execution of a separation agreement
or the institution of a marital action.2 The New York County Su-
'" 65 N.J. at 214, 320 A.2d at 493. Any subsequent increase in the value of assets owned
individually at the time of marriage was held to be separate property. Moreover, any income
derived from such property, any property exchanged for the original asset, or any traceable
proceeds from its sale also would be immune from distribution. Id. The Painter court, how-
ever, carefully noted that any increase attributable to the efforts of the other spouse or the
efforts of both spouses would not necessarily be characterized as separate property. Id. at
214 n.4, 320 A.2d at 493 n.4. The spouse asserting that an asset is immune from distribution
bears the burden of establishing its separate nature. Id. at 214, 320 A.2d at 493.
20 Act of Dec. 31, 1980, ch. 181, § 1, 1980 N.J. Seass. Laws Serv. 609 (amending N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982)). This recent amendment contradicts the
definition of distributable property established in Painter. See note 18 and accompanying
text supra. The New Jersey Legislature contemplated that most gifts, devises, or bequests
would be received from parents or relatives of the recipient spouse. To compel the division
of these assets would be contrary to the expectations of both the recipients and the donors.
Since neither spouse's efforts resulted in the obtaining of the asset, it should not be deemed
a marital asset under the partnership concept. SEN. JUDiCLARY COMM. STATEMENT No. 1229,
ch. 181, 1980 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 610, reprinted in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1981-
1982). For a discussion of the legislative history and retroactive application of the 1980
amendment, see Bellinger v. Bellinger, 177 N.J. Super. 650, 652-53, 427 A.2d 620, 621-22
(Ch. Div. 1981).
21 See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra. Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) with Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320
A.2d 484, 493 (1974). Although the Painter rule excluding property received during the mar-
riage by gift, bequest, or devise from the definition of "separate property" was still effective
when the New York statute was enacted in June 1980, the New Jersey State Assembly was
considering an amendment which ultimately resulted in its abolition. See Bellinger v. Bel-
linger, 177 N.J. Super. 650, 652-53, 427 A.2d 620, 621-22 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981); note 20
supra. The New York definition of separate property surpasses the New Jersey definition in
scope by encompassing compensation for personal injuries and property specifically allo-
cated as separate by written agreement of the parties. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §
236(B)(1)(d)(2), (4) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
22 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The new definition
of marital property marks a radical departure from prior New York law. Formerly, marital
property consisted of jointly owned property such as a marital residence owned by both
spouses as tenants in the entirety or a joint bank account. Foster & Freed, Family Law,
supra note 11, at 341. In enacting the equitable distribution law, however, the New York
legislature intended to recognize marriage as an economic partnership. Id. The statutory
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preme Court, however, has concluded that the legislature intended
to postpone the distribution of marital assets owned by separate
spouses until the institution of an action to dissolve the marriage.2 3
Thus, property obtained after the institution of a separation action
may be subjected to distribution if the marriage is subsequently
dissolved.24 Separate property and property which the spouses
have agreed to treat differently are excluded from the marital
property category.25 Separate property also encompasses property
acquired by bequest, devise, or descent, or by gift from someone
other than the spouse.28
definition of marital property, therefore, was premised upon the theory that family assets
acquired through individual or joint effort should be distributed equitably upon dissolution
of the marriage. Id.; see Kobylack v. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d 402, 406, 442 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1981). Recently, Justice Rigler examined the length of the
marriage to determine to whom the funds deposited in joint bank accounts belonged. Abbe
v. Abbe, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1981, at 12, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1981).
23 Jolis v. Jolis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1981, at 11, col. 1, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The
husband in Jolis commenced a separation action on the ground of cruelty. Id. at 11, col. 1.
Approximately 38 months later, he served a notice of intention to amend his complaint to
state a cause of action for divorce. Id. Reasoning that the wife was not aware that the pend-
ing action might terminate the marriage until the service of this document, the court con-
cluded that its service constituted the commencement of a marital action for equitable dis-
tribution purposes. Id. at 11, col. 2. Because matrimonial practice postpones the actual
disposition of such motions until trial, the court believed it would be unjust to fix that date
as the date of commencement of the matrimonial action. Id.
24 Id.
2 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c), (d)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); Foster,
Commentary on Equitable Distribution, supra note 6, at 9-10. Property may be designated
as separate by a contractual agreement between the spouses. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(d)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Critical to the enactment of this legislation was
the offering of the opinion to spouses to divide their property in an agreed manner. Foster &
Freed, Family Law, supra note 11, at 345. Section 5-311 of the General Obligations Law has
been amended to prohibit, except as provided in N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982), any contract between husband and wife to relieve either of liability for
the other's support which would result in the other becoming a public charge. Ch. 281, § 47,
[1980] N.Y. Laws 387 (McKinney) (N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311 (McKinney 1978).
26 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). In a memoran-
dum accompanying his approval of the equitable distribution legislation, Governor Carey
stated that its premise was the recognition that marriage is an economic partnership. The
assets produced during the partnership should be distributed in a manner designed to meet
the "individual needs and circumstances of the parties regardless of the name in which such
property is held." Governor's Memorandum filed with Assembly Bill 6200-A, June 19, 1980,
reprinted in GUIDE TO NEW YORK EQUITABLE DisTRmUTIoN, supra note 6, at 608-09; see Jolis
v. Jolis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1981, at 11, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). In their zeal to facilitate
this end, however, the legislators left several unanswered questions which will require judi-
cial interpretation. For example, subsection 2 of the separate property definition includes
"compensation for personal injuries." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982). This rather expansive definition does not differentiate between awards
received as compensation for medical expenses, lost earnings, and pain and suffering. See
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Because these courts are required to distinguish between mari-
tal and separate property, they must be sensitive to a possible in-
termingling of the two types of property. Once joined with marital
property, separate property presumptively becomes marital prop-
erty.27 This presumption, however, may be rebutted if the party
Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV.
67, 85 n.67 (1980). Invariably, the amount expended for these services and the amount of
lost earnings will come out of the marital assets. Id.
Subsection 3 provides that the appreciation in value of separate property caused by the
"contributions or efforts" of the other spouse is marital property. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236
(B)(1)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see Jolis v. Jolis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1981, at 11,
col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). It is conceivable that difficulties will arise regarding the inter-
pretation of the phrase "contributions and efforts." See Foster, Commentary on Equitable
Distribution, supra note 6, at 10-11.
217 Husband T.N.S. v. Wife A.M.S., 407 A.2d 1045, 1047 (Del. 1979) (nonmarital prop-
erty does not remain nonmarital property regardless of how it is held); e.g., Brunson v.
Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky. App. 1978) (income derived from nonmarital property
during the term of the marriage becomes marital property); cf. Malone v. Malone, 64 Idaho
252, 261, 130 P.2d 674, 678 (1942) (net rents and profits, but not gross income, from sepa-
rate nonmarital property held to be community property); Broussard v. Broussard, 340 So.
2d 1309, 1314 (La. 1976) (interest accrued on premarital savings during the existence of the
marriage held to be community property).
Several states which define marital property have incorporated into their equitable dis-
tribution statutes a rebuttable presumption that all property acquired by either party dur-
ing the marriage is "marital property." E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(3) (1973); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(3) (Baldwin
1979). In Delaware, the rebuttable presumption may be overcome by proof that the property
was acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage, that the property was
excluded by valid agreement between the parties, or that the increase in value of the prop-
erty occurred prior to the marriage. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(b)(1)-(3), (c) (Supp.
1981). The statute has been interpreted to place the burden of proof on the party asserting
the exemption from equitable distribution. See E.C.W. v. M.A.W., 419 A.2d 934, 935 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1980) (husband had burden of proving that stock dividends were "acquired in ex-
change for property acquired prior to the marriage"); Halsey B.S. v. Charlotte S.S., 419 A.2d
962, 963 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1980) (husband has burden of proving that stock dividends repre-
sented an increase in value of premarital property); Husband R.T.G. v. Wife G.K.G., 410
A.2d 155, 160 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1979) (burden on wife to prove existence of agreement that
their residence was not to be categorized as marital property). The Illinois statute has been
interpreted similarly. See In re Marriage of Amato, 80 Ill. App. 3d 395, 398-99, 399 N.E.2d
1018, 1020-21 (App. Ct. 1980) (husband had burden of proving that home constructed dur-
ing the marriage was not marital property). Illinois courts also have found that a commin-
gling of nonmarital property and marital property evidences an intent to treat the property
as marital. See id.; Smith v. Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d 858, 865, 396 N.E.2d 859, 864-65 (App.
Ct. 1979); Klingberg v. Klingberg, 68 IM. App. 3d 513, 517, 386 N.E.2d 517, 520 (App. Ct.
1979).
The burden of establishing that a particular asset is immune from equitable distribu-
tion also has been delegated judicially. In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484
(1974), the court interpreted the New Jersey statute to require that the burden of proof
rests upon the party asserting the immunity. Id. at 214, 320 A.2d at 493; see Canova v.
Canova, 146 N.J. Super. 58, 368 A.2d 971 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). In Canova, the plaintiff
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advocating the separate characterization can document the use of
the asset from the date of its initial receipt.28
While New York and New Jersey employ a separate property-
marital property dichotomy in determining which assets may be
distributed, Connecticut has adopted a broader approach. Under
Connecticut law, all property owned by the spouse is eligible for
equitable distribution notwithstanding its date of acquisition.2" In-
deed, in a recent case, the Connecticut Superior Court, New Haven
District, held that the premarital stage of a relationship "should be
considered [in a divorce action] in order to fairly determine the
ultimate rights of the parties that may have accrued over their en-
tire time together."30 The inclusion of separate property, however,
may be unfair to the owner when a just result could be obtained
through the distribution of the available marital property.' On the
other hand, this method of property disposition allows the attain-
ment of an equitable result when the marital property is insuffi-
sought to prove that his marital residence enjoyed an immunity from equitable distribution.
The residence was purchased with proceeds from the sale of a house which the plaintiff had
owned at the inception of the marriage. Id. at 60, 368 A.2d at 972. Subsequently, he trans-
ferred title of the original home to himself and his wife. Id. at 59, 368 A.2d at 971. Relying
on Painter's consideration of interspousal gifts in distributing marital property, the court
held that the second residence was a marital asset subject to equitable distribution, despite
the fact that part of the funds used to buy it could be traced to property once separately
held by the husband. Id. at 62, 368 A.2d at 973.
28 See note 27 supra.
29 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(a) (1981). The Superior Court is empowered to assign to
either spouse any part of the other's estate upon entry of the dissolution or separation de-
cree. Id. This statute eliminates the need for a party to commence multiple suits in order to
obtain an equitable property division. Schoonmaker & Balbirer, Survey of 1976 Develop-
ments in Connecticut Family Law, 51 CONN. B.J. 2, 5 (1977); see Whitney v. Whitney, 171
Conn. 23, 24-25, 368 A.2d 96, 98-99 (1976) (suit by wife for divorce, child support, and ali-
mony followed by suit by husband seeking transfer of property held in wife's name). It is
well settled in Connecticut that the assignment of property in a marital dissolution lies
within the discretion of the court. See Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 572, 427 A.2d 406,
408 (1980); Ridolfi v. Ridolfi, 178 Conn. 377, 379, 423 A.2d 85, 86 (1979); Pasquariello v.
Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 584, 362 A.2d 835, 837 (1975). The contribution of each party
in the acquisition of their respective estates is merely one factor for the judge to consider in
arriving at an equitable settlement. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1981); see Fucci v. Fucci,
179 Conn. 174, 183, 425 A.2d 592, 597 (1979).
20 Vine v. Vine, 7 Fain. L. Rep. 2765, 2766 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981).
31 See Freed, Equitable Distribution in the Common Law States: A Bird's View, in
ECONOMICS OF DIVORCE 22-23 (1978). New York's exclusion of separate property from equi-
table distribution has been lauded as preventing a windfall to any one party. In view of the
increase in the divorce rate and the influx of women into the working world, it no longer is
fair to subject separate property to disposition. See Foster, Statutory Definitions, in GUIDE
TO NEW YORK EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 6, at 55.
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cient or nonexistent.32
These views are but the touchstones of the relevant inquiries.
As a practical matter, many significant assets may not be catego-
rized easily. Occasionally, the distinction between marital and sep-
arate property may be so subtle as to enable some assets to defy
classification. The following section of this Article will summarize
how each state has addressed certain recurring problems of classifi-
cation. Due to recent modifications in New York law, the New
York judiciary has not yet had occasion to consider many of these
problem areas. Indeed, it may be several years before a body of
governing case law develops. In the interim, and where applicable,
New York may look to the experience of its neighboring states,
New Jersey and Connecticut, for guidance.
Pension Plans
Vested pension plans and other deferred benefits are subject
to equitable distribution.3 New Jersey's statute, however, only
permits the distribution of property which was "legally and benefi-
cially acquired . ..during the marriage. ' '34 This statutory limita-
31 See Freed, supra note 31, at 22-23.
Recently, in a case of first impression, the New York Supreme Court, Nassau County,
held that an interest in a vested, though unmatured, noncontributory pension plan was mar-
ital property. Martinez v. Martinez, 7 Farn. L. Rep. 2781 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1981). See generally Fay v. Fay, 108 Misc. 2d 373, 374-75, 437 N.Y.S.2d 601, 602-03 (Sup.
Ct. Suffolk County 1981). The Idartinez court noted that its holding was in accord with the
great weight of authority in both community property and common-law jurisdictions. 7
Farn. L. Rep. at 2781; see, e.g., Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 274, 569 P.2d 214, 215
(1977) (en banc); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 841-42, 544 P.2d 561, 562-63, 126
Cal. Rptr. 633, 634-35 (1976); In re Marriage of Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 239-40, 544 P.2d
639, 640-41 (Ct. App. 1975); In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 658-59, 397 N.E.2d
511, 516 (App. Ct. 1979); Hiscox v. Hiscox, 385 N.E.2d 1166, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979);
Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 476-77, 427 A.2d 76, 79 (Super. Ct. App. Div.),
aff'd, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981); Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 634-35, 261
N.W.2d 457, 463-64 (1978).
34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982). The New Jersey statute views
marriage as the functional equivalent of an economic partnership. See Tucker v. Tucker,
121 N.J. Super. 539, 545-46, 298 A.2d 91, 94-95 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972). Accordingly, the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "[tihe concept of vesting should probably find no
significant place in the developing law of equitable distribution." Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 339,
348, 331 A.2d 257, 262 (1975). Rather, noted the court, the proper inquiry should be whether
the pension benefits were "acquired" during the marriage. Id. The term "acquired," how-
ever, has been given a "broad inclusive meaning." Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 216,
353 .A.2d 144, 146 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976); see, e.g., Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 215-
17, 320 A.2d 484, 494-95 (1974); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 474-75, 427 A.2d
76, 78 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981); Pellegrino v. Pellegrino,
134 N.J. Super. 512, 516, 342 A.2d 226, 228 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
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tion has been interpreted to permit the distribution of that portion
of the pension which was acquired between the date of the mar-
riage and the institution of the divorce action.3 5 Pensions for which
the employee-spouse has qualified during the marriage may be dis-
tributed, even though they may be receivable at the election of the
employee or at some future date. 6
New Jersey case law, however, is unsettled respecting the in-
clusion of pensions which have not yet vested. One appellate court
has held that when an employee-spouse would not be entitled to
receive either a pension or a disbursement of funds paid into the
pension at the time of the divorce, his pension would not be sub-
ject to equitable distribution.3 7 Although subsequent cases have
not expressly overruled this decision, they have employed an "ac-
3' Tucker v. Tucker, 121 N.J. Super. 539, 548, 298 A.2d 91, 95-96 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1972). Only those pension and profit-sharing rights which vested during the marital period
are subject to equitable distribution. Id. at 550, 298 A.2d at 97. Benefits contingent upon
continued employment or total disability were excluded from equitable distribution by the
Tucker court. 121 N.J. Super. at 548-49, 298 A.2d at 96 (citing Williamson v. Williamson,
203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)). The rationale for the
exclusion is that:
Pensions become community property, subject to division in a divorce, when and
to the extent that the party is certain to receive some payment or recovery of
funds. To the extent that payment is, at the time of the divorce, subject to condi-
tions which may or may not occur, the pension is an expectancy, not subject to
division as community property.
121 N.J. Super. at 549, 298 A.2d at 96 (quoting Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d
at 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 167). The filing of the divorce decree, rather than the date of the
abandonment or other conduct giving rise to the divorce, is the point at which the marriage
is deemed terminated. See 121 N.J. Super. at 544, 298 A.2d at 93.
" Pensions in which nonforfeitable interests are acquired during the marriage are sub-
ject to equitable distribution. Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 469, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977);
see Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 134 N.J. Super. 512, 515, 342 A.2d 226, 227-28 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975). The right to receive monies is an economic resource, Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. at
468, 375 A.2d at 662, which is akin to deferred compensation-a substitution of wages
earned during the course of a marriage. Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 475-76, 427
A.2d 76, 78-79 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), afl'd, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981); McGrew v.
McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 518, 377 A.2d 697, 699 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Scherzer
v. Scherzer, 136 N.J. Super. 397, 401-02, 346 A.2d 434, 436-37 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975);
Weir v. Weir, 173 N.J. Super. 130, 134, 413 A.2d 638, 640 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980); Blitt v.
Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 218, 353 A.2d 144, 147 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
31 White v. White, 136 N.J. Super. 552, 553-54, 347 A.2d 360, 361 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975). The pension plan in White was funded solely by employer contributions. The pension
holder did not have a right of withdrawal and his right to receive future benefits was contin-
gent upon attaining the age of 40 and either completing 10 years of service or becoming
totally disabled. Id. Since the defendant had not fully satisfied these eligibility require-
ments, the court held that the pension benefits were not subject to equitable distribution.
Id. at 554, 347 A.2d at 361.
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quired property" analysis.3 8 Under this analysis, a pension for
which an employee-spouse has not yet qualified arguably may have
been earned partially during the marriage if the right to the pen-
sion is reasonably certain to become receivable or the amount paid
is dispensable to the employee-spouse.39
As if to preclude such an argument, the Chancery Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court imposed an additional requirement
on the pension plan analysis. 0 Noting that the statute required
that marital property be legally and beneficially acquired, the
court held that the employee-spouse must have had the power to
"control, use or enjoy [the] asset" in order for it to be subject to
equitable distribution.41 While relying on the statutory language to
reach its result, this analysis will not allow a court to effectuate a
completely equitable distribution in every situation. Where the
employee-spouse has no present right to the pension, but is on the
verge of qualifying for such a right, the beneficial acquisition test
would nevertheless exclude the pension from equitable dis-
tribution.42
See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
'9 While there may be uncertainty as to whether the retirement benefits will come into
the possession of the pension holder, the critical issue for the purposes of distributing future
pension proceeds is the extent to which the anticipated benefits will be the product of mari-
tal efforts. McGrew v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 518, 377 A.2d 697, 699 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977); see Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 76, 78 (Super. Ct.
App. Div.), af'd, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). This inquiry requires comprehensive inter-
pretation of the statutory phrase "acquired ... during the marriage." N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A34-23 (West Supp. 1981-1982); see notes 31 & 36 and accompanying text supra. In In re
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 845-47, 544 P.2d 561, 565-66, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637-38
(1976), the California Supreme Court held that future pension rights, although wholly con-
tingent, are deferred compensation subject to distribution upon the dissolution of the
marriage.
40 Mueller v. Mueller, 166 N.J. Super. 557, 561, 400 A.2d 136, 139 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1979).
41 Id. at 560, 400 A.2d at 138. Mueller was premised upon the statutory construction
which the New Jersey Supreme Court employed when addressing the distributability of an
interest in a trust. Id. at 560-61, 400 A.2d at 137-38 (citing Mey v. Mey, 79 N.J. 121, 398
A.2d 88 (1979), aff'g 149 N.J. Super. 188, 373 A.2d 664 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977)). The
Mey court had interpreted the statutory requirement that an asset be "legally and benefi-
cially acquired" during the marriage to include "the effective power to control or use or
enjoy" the asset. 79 N.J. at 124, 398 A.2d at 89. Applying this additional requirement, the
Mueller court held that a fully vested pension plan contingent upon the attainment of a
specified age was not subject to equitable distribution. 166 N.J. Super. at 561, 400 A.2d at
139.
42 Under the Mey court's construction of the New Jersey equitable distribution statute,
see note 41 and accompanying text supra, an employee-spouse whose pension almost has
vested at the time of divorce would have only a mere expectation of receiving pension bene-
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Recognizing the inadequacy inherent in this approach, a sub-
sequent case has held that the relevant inquiries must be whether
a "property right has been acquired during the marriage and
whether equity warrants its inclusion in the marital estate in light
of its limitations. ' 43 This analysis may allow the equitable distri-
bution of a nonvested pension plan. Where the pension has almost
vested and was earned mostly during coverture, equity would favor
its inclusion if the employee-spouse had no vested interest at the
time of the divorce. It should be noted, however, that no subse-
quent New Jersey opinion has dealt with a pension plan in which
the employee-spouse had not qualified for benefits or a refund of
the monies contributed.
Finally, the New Jersey courts have minimized the distinction
between contributory and noncontributory pensions.44 Since a non-
contributory pension plan is funded exclusively by the employer, it
is deemed a benefit conferred upon the employee-spouse which
otherwise would be manifested in the form of additional wages.
fits. Such an expectation would not be an asset subject to equitable distribution. See Weir v.
Weir, 173 N.J. Super. 130, 134, 413 A.2d 638, 640 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980); Blitt v. Blitt,
139 N.J. Super. 213, 216-17, 353 A.2d 144, 146 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
'3 Weir v. Weir, 173 N.J. Super. 130, 133-34, 413 A.2d 638, 640 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1980). In Weir, as in Mueller, see notes 40-41 supra, the pension holder had acquired a right
to future retirement benefits, but not to their present enjoyment. Additionally, there was
some uncertainty as to whether the employee-spouse would ever receive the pension benefits
since they terminated upon his death. Id. at 133, 413 A.2d at 640. Nevertheless, the court
refused to require that the employee have "effective power to control or use or enjoy" the
proceeds. Id. at 134-35, 413 A.2d at 640-41. Accordingly, the pension plan was subjected to
equitable distribution. Id. at 139, 413 A.2d at 642-43. Faced with the practical problem of
assuring a fair distribution of the pension proceeds, the Weir court suggested a deferred
distribution method whereby the interest in the fund would be calculated and distributed
once the funds became available. Id. at 134-35, 413 A.2d at 640-41; see Kikkert v. Kikkert,
177 N.J. Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76, 80 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), af'd, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d
317 (1981). Alternatively, the court could ascertain the present value of the proceeds and
distribute them immediately. Weir v. Weir, 173 N.J. Super. at 135, 413 A.2d at 641. Al-
though the present value may be inexact and calculation may be difficult, it avoids the con-
tinued hostility which accompanies the "long term and deferred sharing of financial inter-
ests." Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79.
Adopting the Weir rationale that a right to receive a future asset is a form of deferred
compensation, the Kikkert court recently subjected to equitable distribution a pension in-
terest contingent upon the holder reaching an unattained age. Id. at 476-77, 427 A.2d at 77-
79; see Weir v. Weir, 173 N.J. Super. at 133-34, 400 A.2d at 640. The Kikkert court observed
that "[e]ach spouse had the same expectation of future enjoyment with the knowledge that
the pensioner need only survive to receive it." 177 N.J. Super. at 476-77, 427 A.2d at 79.
" See, e.g., Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 476-77, 427 A.2d 76, 79 (Super. Ct.
App. Div.), af'd, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981); McGrew v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515,
517, 377 A.2d 697, 698 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 218-
19, 353 A.2d 144, 147 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
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Both spouses, therefore, are forebearing income which they would
receive absent the pension. Consequently, an equitable distribution
of the noncontributory pension is in order.45
While New York's statute enumerates the loss of pension
rights as a factor to be considered in determining the impact of the
dissolution of the marriage,46 it leaves the determination of when a
pension becomes a right to judicial interpretation. By employing a
broad range of permissible discretion, New York courts will be able
to include nonvested pensions without resort to various formulae
to obtain this result.47 Such a step would go further than the pre-
sent New Jersey law and would follow the rationale of several com-
mon-law property states which use the theory of equitable distri-
bution upon divorce. 8 In view of the trend toward examining the
equities of a particular case, it appears unlikely that New York will
define pension rights merely as those which have vested.
The Connecticut statute, although not expressly including
pensions, would allow the consideration of pensions in making an
equitable distribution.49 Nonetheless, the statute expressly requires
5 In Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 218, 353 A.2d 144, 147 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1976), the court took judicial notice of the fact that "lucrative profit sharing and pension
plans are realistically wage substitutes." Id.; see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
46 N.Y. DoM. REL LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). This section of
the statute requires that "the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the
marriage" be considered when marital assets are distributed upon divorce. As one of the 10
factors enumerated in subsection five, the loss of pension rights is a concrete guideline
designed to assist the trial court in its exploration of the financial condition of the parties.
See, e.g., Martinez v. Martinez, 7 Fain. Law Rep. 2781, 2782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1981); Ettinger v. Ettinger, 107 Misc. 2d 675, 676, 435 N.Y.S.2d 916, 917-18 (Sup. Ct. Nas-
sau County 1981).
47 Cf. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 841-42, 544 P.2d 561, 562-63, 126 Cal
Rptr. 633, 634-35 (1976) (en banc) (pension rights derived from marital contributions repre-
sented deferred compensation regardless of whether the pensionholder's rights had "vested"
during the marriage).
4' Various common-law property jurisdictions have adopted the reasoning advanced in
In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 841-42, 544 P.2d 561, 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
634-35 (1976) (en banc), see note 47 supra, in interpreting their equitable distribution stat-
utes. See, e.g., Linson v. Linson, 618 P.2d 748, 749-51 (Hawaii App. Ct. 1980); In re Mar-
riage of Hunt, 78 IlM. App. 3d 653, 660-64, 397 N.E.2d 511, 517-19 (App. Ct. 1979); Leighton
v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 633-36, 261 N.W.2d 457, 463-64 (1978).
", The Connecticut equitable distribution statute grants the court broad discretion
when distributing property upon divorce. Section 46b-81(c) provides in pertinent part:
In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court,
after hearing the witnesses . . . shall consider the length of the marriage, the
causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age,
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, em-
ployability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity
19821
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that a court consider the contribution of each party to the asset."
Operating on the theory that a wife's contribution to the marriage
as a homemaker offsets a husband's earnings, a Connecticut court
could render an opinion finding an equal contribution by each
spouse toward the husband's pension benefits.51 At the present
time, however, there is no Connecticut case law pertaining to the
disposition of pensions in an equitable distribution.
Federal and quasi-federal pensions may present special
problems. Under the New Jersey case of Hipsley v. Hipsley,52 a
retirement pension under the Federal Railroad Retirement Pen-
sion Act is not subject to equitable distribution."' Comparing the
development of coverage and rates in the Railroad Retirement Act
and the Social Security Act, the court found striking parallels be-
tween them.54 Noting that the railroad benefits replace rather than
of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1981) (emphasis added); see Krause v. Krause, 174 Conn.
361, 363-64, 387 A.2d 548, 549 (1978). Under the Connecticut law, pensions may be catego-
rized as an "amount and source of income" in determining the distribution of property. See
generally Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, supra note 6, at 36-41; Note, New
York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, supra note 26, at 98-104.
0 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1981). The Connecticut statute directs the court to
"consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or apprecia-
tion in value of their respective estates." Id.
11 By statute or decision, 28 states currently include the services of the homemaker as a
factor in determining an alimony award or the distribution of property. Freed & Foster,
Divorce in the Fifty States, supra note 1, at 246. The contribution of the homemaker to the
acqusition of income or property during the marriage has been viewed as an important con-
sideration in the determination of any "equitable" arrangement. See, e.g., Rothman v. Roth-
man, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (1974). See generally Burch, Property Rights of
De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q.
101, 110-14 (1976); Hauserman & Fethke, Valuation of a Homemaker's Services, 22 TRIAL
LAW. GUIDE 249, 258-62 (1978); Martin, Social Security Benefits For Spouses, 63 CORNEL
L. REv. 789, 828-31 (1978); 45 ALB. L. REv., supra note 11, at 492.
52 161 N.J. Super. 119, 390 A.2d 1220 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
Id. at 127-28, 390 A.2d at 1223-24. The Railroad Retirement Act was enacted to pro-
vide a system of retirement and disability benefits for railroad employees. Railroad Retire-
ment Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-485, § 2, 48 Stat. 1283, 1284 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §
231 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-445, § 101, 88 Stat. 1305 (1974). The Act as
restated was designated the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974. The original act was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S.
330, 374 (1935), but was reenacted to resemble the Social Security Act in form. Railroad
Retirement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-162, § 2, 50 Stat. 307, 309; see Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 574 n.3 (1979).
Hipsley v. Hipsley, 161 N.J. Super. 119, 126-27, 390 A.2d 1220, 1223-24 (Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1978). The Hipsley court initially compared the Railroad Retirement Act pension
and the military retirement pension subjected to equitable distribution in Kruger v. Kruger,
73 N.J. 464, 470-71, 375 A.2d 659, 663 (1977). 161 N.J. Super. at 125-26, 390 A.2d at 1223.
Contrasting military retirement allowances with contributions made by railroad employees
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supplement social security benefits, the court concluded that the
"benefits under the railroad retirement plan should no more be
subject to equitable distribution than a comparable employee's
right to social security upon his retirement. '55 Because equitable
distribution has not been extended to include the distribution of
Social Security benefits, the Hipsley court likewise refused to sub-
ject the railroad pension to equitable distribution. 6
Hipsley anticipated the result in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,57
wherein the United States Supreme Court stated that the railroad
pension "corresponds exactly to those [benefits] an employee
would expect to receive were he covered by the Social Security
Act." Indeed, both social security payments and railroad pensions
are protected from general creditors. 9 Since Congress had ex-
to a retirement fund, the Hipsley court found several distinguishing factors which prompted
the conclusion that railroad pensions could not be distributed upon divorce. 161 N.J. Super.
at 126-27, 390 A.2d at 1223-24. First, the court noted that contributions to a railroad retire-
ment fund are taxed at special rates and are not taxable upon receipt. Id. at 126, 390 A.2d
at 1223; see Railroad Retirement Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3201 (1976). Furthermore, the court
stated that the benefits are statutory and not contractual in nature. 161 N.J. Super. at 126,
390 A.2d at 1223. The court found most significant, however, the fact that employees cov-
ered by the Railroad Retirement Act are not entitled to receive retirement benefits from the
social security system. Id. at 126-27, 390 A.2d at 1224.
15 Hipsley v. Hipsley, 161 N.J. Super. 119, 127, 390 A.2d 1220, 1224 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1978).
6 Id. at 128, 390 A.2d at 1224. The Hipsley court reasoned that social security benefits
were not distributable because Congress intended that those benefits provide financial pro-
tection for the employee and his family. Id. at 127, 390 A.2d at 1224. To award a former
spouse a portion of those benefits would be tantamount to supplementing her own social
security payments at the expense of the employee in derogation of the congressional pur-
pose. Id. Since railroad retirement benefits replace social security benefits, similar reasoning
prohibits their distribution upon divorce. Id. at 127-28, 390 A.2d at 1224.
Z 439 U.S. 572 (1979). For a discussion of Hisquierdo, see Reppy, Learning to Live
with Hisquierdo, 6 COMM. PROP. J. 5 (1979).
'8 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 575 (1979); see Allen v. Allen, 363 S.W.2d
312, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (wife may not be awarded a portion of anticipated railroad
retirement benefits). See generally Rombauer, Marital Status and Eligibility for Federal
Statutory Income Benefits: A Historical Survey, 52 WASH. L. REv. 227, 257-60 (1977).
Although domestic relations traditionally has been a matter of local law, the Hisquierdo
Court initially concluded that it had jurisdiction because of a conflict between state commu-
nity property law and the Railroad Retirement Act. 439 U.S. at 581-83. Turning to the
merits, Justice Blackmun observed that any anticipated diminution in pension benefits
would discourage a divorced employee from retiring. Id. at 585. Since that would defeat the
legislative intention to maintain an efficient workforce, a divided Court concluded that Cali-
fornia must defer to the federal scheme embodied in the Railroad Retirement Act. Id.
'9 439 U.S. at 586-87. Section 231m of the Railroad Retirement Act provides that "no
annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnish-
ment, attachment, or other legal process." Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. § 231m
(1976).
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pressly exempted spousal and child support claims from the statu-
tory rule against garnishment, a specific exception also would be
required to empower a state court to distribute either social secur-
ity benefits or railroad pensions.60 Finding no such exception, the
Court held that a railroad pension, like social security benefits, is
not subject to distribution as community property upon divorce.6 1
Whether the Supreme Court would extend Hisquierdo's ratio-
nale to encompass a military pension plan was the issue considered
in McCarty v. McCarty.12 The McCarty Court initially reviewed its
prior holding in Hisquierdo, stating:
Hisquierdo did not hold that only the particular statutory terms
there considered would justify a finding of pre-emption; rather, it
held that "[t]he pertinent questions are whether the right as as-
serted conflicts with the express terms of federal law and whether
its consequences sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal
program to require nonrecognition. ' 's6
60 439 U.S. at 583-85. An exception to the prohibition against garnishment enables fed-
eral benefits to be reached to satisfy child support or alimony obligations. 42 U.S.C. § 659(a)
(1976 & Supp. III 1979). Alimony, however, does not include property subject to equitable
distribution or division in accordance with community property principles. Id. § 662(c)
(1976 & Supp. III 1979).
61 439 U.S. at 589-90. The Hisquierdo Court noted that Congress had not abolished the
distinction which it drew for garnishment purposes between alimony and community prop-
erty. Id.; see notes 52-53 supra. Although the wife in Hisquierdo had been employed for 35
years and fully expected to receive social security benefits upon her retirement, those bene-
fits were not claimed to be community property. 439 U.S. at 579. Nevertheless, the wife
claimed to be entitled to part of her husband's pension benefits. Id. at 578. See also Reppy,
Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits After Mar-
riage of Brown and ERISA, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 417, 421-43 (1978) (discussing the extent to
which private pension plans may be treated as community property under California law).
62 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2735 (1981). McCarty reversed a line of state court decisions allowing
the distribution of military retirement pay. See, e.g., Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 471-72,
375 A.2d 659, 663 (1977); note 54 supra.
63 101 S. Ct. at 2735. Generally, courts have held that a pension is a valuable asset
subject to distribution. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 562-
63, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634-35 (1976). See generally Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who
Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, 5 PEPSRwiNE L.
REv. 191, 205-20 (1978); Comment, Toward A More Equitable Distribution of Pension Ben-
efits, 3 S.U.L. Rav. 51, 53-55 (1976). Despite the Supreme Court decisions in Hisquierdo and
McCarty, the view that all pensions are property in which the spouse has an interest has not
yet diminished appreciably. In cases involving private pension plans, courts have continued
to hold that "equitable considerations mandate their inclusion for distribution." Kikkert v.
Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 476, 427 A.2d 76, 79 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), af'd, 88 N.J. 4,
438 A.2d 317 (1981); see Russell v. Russell, 436 A.2d 524, 525 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981);
Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, 399, 431 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Hughes v.
Hughes, 634 P.2d 1271 (N.M. Sup. Ct. 1981). Furthermore, state courts have limited the
impact of McCarty by subjecting military pensions to equitable distribution if the judgment
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Unlike the retirement plan considered in Hisquierdo, the military
retirement plan in McCarty represented continuing compensation
for services.6 4 Reasoning that Congress intended a military pension
to be a personal benefit with the retiree ultimately deciding
"whether or not to leave part of that retirement pay as an annuity
to his survivors," the Court concluded that Congress had not cho-
sen to benefit an ex-spouse as it had a surviving spouse.0 5 As it had
or agreement predated McCarty. Sheldon v. Sheldon, 124 Cal. App. 3d 371, 177 Cal. Rptr.
380, 384 (Ct. App. 1981); Mahone v. Mahone, 123 Cal. App. 3d 17, 176 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276
(Ct. App. 1981); Braden v. Reno, 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2041, 2041-42 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Nov.
3, 1981). See generally Foster & Freed, Supreme Court Incursions Into State Family Law,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 26, 1981, at 1, col. 1; see also Ridgway v. Ridgway, 102 S. Ct. 49, 57 (1981)
(military service members' life insurance proceeds not divisible).
In Ridgway v. Ridgway, 102 S. Ct. 49 (1981), a retired army sergeant was required by a
divorce decree to maintain his life insurance policy for the benefit of his children. Id. at 51.
At the time of the divorce, Sergeant Ridgway was insured pursuant to the Serviceman's
Group Life Insurance Act of 1965 (SGLIA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 765-779 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)
and had named his first wife as beneficiary. 102 S. Ct. at 51; see 38 U.S.C. § 770(a) (1976).
The Act gave the servicemen the right freely to designate the beneficiary. 102 S. Ct. at 53.
When Ridgway remarried 4 months later he directed that the proceeds of the policy be paid
as specified "by law." Under the SGLIA, payment was to be made to the insured's lawful
spouse at the date of death. Id. at 51-52; see 38 U.S.C. §§ 765(7), 770(a) (1976). After he
died, both his first and second wives sued in Maine state court for the proceeds, the former
wife seeking the imposition of a constructive trust in favor of his children. 102 S. Ct. at 52.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine imposed a constructive trust on the proceeds in favor
of the Ridgway children. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed, discerning an in-
consistency between the state and federal law. Id. at 59. Since the SGLIA gives the insured
the right to freely designate his beneficiary, the Maine divorce decree was invalid to the
extent that it hampered the exercise of that federally created right. Id. at 57. By imposing a
constructive trust upon the life insurance proceeds, Maine had run afoul of the broad anti-
attachment provision of the SGLIA. Id. at 58.
McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2736 (1981). In reviewing its decision in His-
quierdo, the Court noted that, under the Railroad Retirement Act, a spouse was entitled to
a separate annuity subject to termination upon divorce. Military retirement benefits, how-
ever, included no similar provision for payments to the spouse. Id. at 2737. Thus, the Court
concluded, the military pension was not a limited community property, but rather a per-
sonal entitlement of the service member. Id.; see note 66 infra.
The Court noted that the retired officer remains a member of the service subject to
recall to active duty "at any time." 101 S. Ct. at 2736. Moreover, the retiree may forfeit
some or all of his benefits if he engages in certain prohibited activities. Id. Thus, military
pensions differ from ordinary retirement pensions since military pensions can be viewed as
reduced compensation for continuing services. See United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244, 245
(1881). But see Fithian v. Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 604, 517 P.2d 449, 456-57, 111 Cal. Rptr.
369, 376-77, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974) (military retirement pay is deferred compensa-
tion, not current compensation for reduced services); Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 470, 375
A.2d 659, 662 (1977).
65 101 S. Ct. at 2737, 2738 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 481, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1971));
see 10 U.S.C. § 1434 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). As evidence of its finding that Congress in-
tended military retirement benefits to be treated as a personal entitlement, the Court noted
that an officer could designate a beneficiary to receive unpaid arrearages. Absent arrearages,
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in Hisquierdo, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the
retirement statute, noting that a proposed amendment to allow
partial distribution of a military pension in favor of a spouse, for-
mer spouse, or child was not included in the Senate bill although it
had been passed by the House.6 The McCarty Court also found
significance in two amendments to the Social Security Act.17 One
amendment made all federal benefits, including those payable to
members of the armed forces, subject to child support or alimony
orders.6 8 A subsequent amendment excluded from the definition of
alimony any "division of property between spouses or former
spouses."' 9 Discerning a conflict between the federal retirement
law and the wife's claim for community property, the Court in-
quired whether permitting distribution would frustrate the federal
objectives underlying the military pension program.7 0 In enacting a
military retirement system, Congress had a dual purpose. 1 It in-
tended to provide for the retired service member and to meet the
personnel management needs of the military forces.72 Believing
that both goals would be frustrated by the distribution of a mili-
tary retirement fund, the Court held that any such distribution
however, payments would cease upon death. Id. at 2736-37; cf. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S.
655, 658-59 (1950) (serviceman authorized to select beneficiaries under armed forces life
insurance plan).
66 101 S. Ct. at 2739. The McCarty Court emphasized that Congress intended that the
retiree receive his entire pension. The House of Representatives proposed a provision which
would have permitted the attachment of half of an individual's military retirement pay to
comply with a court order in favor of a spouse, former spouse, or child. Id. (citing H.R. REP.
No. 481, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971)). The Senate bill did not include such a provision. 101
S. Ct. at 2739 (citing S. REP. No. 1089, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1972)).
67 101 S. Ct. at 2740. The Court discussed the Social Security Act amendments permit-
ting the garnishment of federal pension payments in the cases of alimony and child support,
though not for the equitable distribution of marital property. Id.; see notes 59-60 supra.
"I Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 459, 88 Stat. 2357 (1975) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 659 (1976)).
69 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 462, 91 Stat. 159 (1977) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 662(c) (Supp. III 1979)).
10 101 S. Ct. at 2741. The Court stated the proper test to be whether the "application of
community property principles to military retired pay threatens grave harm to 'clear and
substantial' federal interests." Id. The federal interest involved relates to the power and
necessity of raising and supporting armed forces. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
71 101 S. Ct. at 2741.
72 Id. Specifically, the McCarty Court noted that Congress had devised a scheme
designed to encourage retirement so that a "youthful and vigorous" military could be main-
tained. Id. at 2742. The reduction in retirement pay which would result from a property
award would discourage retirement and possibly provide an incentive to remain on active
duty since current income earned after divorce would not be subject to equitable distribu-
tion. Id.
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would be impermissible. 5
This holding represents an extension of the Hisquierdo ratio-
nale. In Hisquierdo, the Court interpreted a statute which in-
cluded a limited amount of community property rights, holding
that Congress had included only limited rights and consciously
decided against enlarging them.74 Because the Court in McCarty
addressed a statute which included no distribution rights, the dis-
senters thought that the absence of the limited rights present in
Hisquierdo would require a contrary conclusion.75 The proposed
amendment to the military retirement benefits legislation, how-
ever, indicated that the inference to be drawn was not merely a
neutral omission of congressional action.76 Rather, having failed to
pass the amendment, the demonstrated intent of Congress was to
prohibit the distribution of military pensions upon divorce. 7
Moreover, it should be noted that this rationale may be applicable
to private pensions in commerce-related industries which are cov-
ered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA).78
73 Id. Addressing the effect of distribution on the individual service member, the Mc-
Carty Court noted that an award to the former spouse would contravene the congressional
intent that the benefits from the retirement fund should belong to the serviceman alone.
Military personnel management would also be disrupted by the distribution of retirement
benefits because it would diminish the pension's value as an inducement for enlistment or
reenlistment.
74 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. .572, 584-85 (1979). Recognizing that the statute
in question embodied a form of community property, the Hisquierdo Court stated that Con-
gress had "carefully targeted the benefits created by the Railroad Retirement Act." Id. at
584. Although the statutory balance is delicate, "[i]t is for Congress to decide how these
finite funds are to be allocated." Id. at 585. Employing an analysis which foreshadowed that
applied in McCarty, see note 66 supra, the Court stated that the reduction of benefits
through equitable distribution discourages the divorced employee from retiring because the
former spouse cannot claim a community property interest in salary earned after divorce.
Id.
I 75 McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2747 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Noting
that the statute at issue in McCarty did not contain any provision analogous to the annuity
provision of the Railroad Retirement Act in Hisquierdo, the dissenting Justices suggested
that there could be no preemption, since the argument could not be made, as it was in
Hisquierdo, that Congress had confronted the issue and drawn the line. Id. (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The dissent reasoned that the Hisquierdo Court had identified the Railroad
Retirement Act's annuity provision as a limited community property concept and had de-
ferred to Congress' explicit curtailment of that concept. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
note 64 supra.
71 101 S. Ct. at 2739.
7 Id.; see notes 58-59 supra.
7' See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. II 1979). Prior cases which have upheld
the equitable distribution of ERISA benefits, see, e.g., Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 55-
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Professional Degrees
Frequently, one spouse finances the other spouse's profes-
sional education or simply supports the student spouse during the
educational period. Thus, the issue arises whether a professional
degree and/or the subsequent increase in earning capacity made
available by the degree is an asset subject to equitable distribution.
Recently, in Lynn v. Lynn,7 9 a New Jersey Superior Court ad-
dressed this question, holding that a medical degree and license to
practice medicine obtained during the marriage are marital assets
subject to equitable distribution."0 Emphasizing the fact that its
57, 394 A.2d 153, 156-57 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978), may have to be reevaluated after the
Hisquierdo and McCarty decisions. See generally Doyle, E.R.LS.A. and the Non-Employee
Spouse's Community Interest in Retirement Pay, 4 COMM. PROP. J. 3 (1977).
7' Lynn v. Lynn, 7 Fan. L. Rep. 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. December 5, 1980).
80 Id. at 3007. Mr. Lynn was a first-year medical student while Mrs. Lynn held a lucra-
tive laboratory position when they were married. Id. at 3001. The working spouse subli-
mated her aspiration to become a doctor to her husband's desire to achieve the identical
goal. Id. The court found that Mrs. Lynn's contributions to her husband's education were
critical and incontrovertible. Id. After obtaining his medical degree, Dr. Lynn's earnings still
were roughly half those of his wife's. Id. Nevertheless, the court found that equity de-
manded that the medical school degree and license to practice medicine be subjected to
equitable distribution. Id. at 3007.
Numerous other jurisdictions also have addressed this issue. In Daniels v. Daniels, 20
Ohio App. 2d 458, 461, 185 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ct. App. 1961), an Ohio Court of Appeals
concluded that a medical degree constituted property, which could be taken into account by
the trial court in awarding alimony. The court, however, did not consider whether the de-
gree was property subject to equitable distribution. See id. Similarly, in Moss v. Moss, 80
Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1978), the court awarded a wife $15,000 in recog-
nition of her contribution towards the acquisition of her husband's medical degree, id. at
694-95, 264 N.W.2d at 98, noting that it would be "impossible to award the wife a portion of
the . . . degree," id. at 695, 264 N.W.2d at 98; accord, Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266,
267-68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). Notwithstanding the theoretical and practical difficulties in-
volved, a Kentucky appellate court remanded a case with instructions to ascertain a wife's
proprietary interest in her husband's dental education based on her monetary contribution
toward his enhanced earning capacity. 578 S.W.2d at 269. Because the educational costs
precluded the acquisition of significant marital assets, the court stated that this was the
only way to achieve an equitable result. Id. at 268. Generally, these decisions allowed recov-
ery, apparently in restitution, although the proprietary nature of an educational degree has
been recognized. See In re Marriage of Cropp, 5 Farn. L. Rep. 2957, 2958 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
1979); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 447, 419 A.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1980); cf. Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2193 (Mass. Prob. & Faro. Ct. 1981)
(wife who supported husband throughout dental school entitled to share value of license to
practice orthodontia). But see In re Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978) (ad-
vanced degree has "none of the attributes of property"); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App.
652, 655-56, 365 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ct. App. 1977) (future income construed not to include
property); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978) (degree is not a
distributable asset although future earning capacity generated by the degree is distributa-
ble); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750-52 (Okla. 1979) (allowing restitutional recov-
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sole concern was the professional license and degree, the Lynn
court distinguished a prior case which refused to recognize an indi-
vidual's enhanced earning capacity as a separate item of prop-
erty.81 Indeed, noted the court, previous case law had recognized
that the degree itself was a property right.2 The Lynn court,
therefore, subjected the degree to equitable distribution, comment-
ing that "[t]o do otherwise would render courts of equity impotent
and unable to do more than recognize what all courts agree to be
an 'obvious injustice.' "83 Although yet unpublished, it is likely that
ery though expressly rejecting contention that educational degree is distributable); DeWitt
v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 60, 296 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Ct. App. 1980) (lower court erred in
holding educational degree was marital property); cf. Aufmuth v. Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d
446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (Ct. App. 1979) (husband's legal degree is not community
property); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (Ct. App. 1969) (re-
jecting conceptualization of legal degree as community property). See generally Note, Fam-
ily Law: Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisible as Property Upon Divorce?, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 517 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Professional Degree]; Comment, Pro-
fessional Education as a Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, 64 IOWA L. REv. 705
(1979).
81 Lynn v. Lynn, 7 Faro. L. Rep. 3001, 3002 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 5, 1980)
(citing Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975)). In Stern, the husband's
law firm kept an account for the payments that would be due to each partner upon his
death. Although adopting that value and the value of his capital account as the presumptive
value of his partnership interest, 66 N.J. at 346, 331 A.2d at 259-61, the court nevertheless
held that the husband's earning capacity was not a separate asset subject to distribution, id.
at 345, 331 A.2d at 260. The Stern court stated, however, that enhanced earning capacity is
a permissible consideration when determining an equitable distribution or calculating ali-
mony. Id.
82 7 Farn. L. Rep. at 3005 (citing Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 447, 419
A.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980)). The wife in Mahoney was employed
throughout the marriage and she supported the household during a 16-month period while
her husband attended graduate school 175 N.J. Super. at 444-45, 419 A.2d at 1149. During
that period she also paid all of her husband's educational expenses. Id. at 445, 419 A.2d at
1149. The court reimbursed Mrs. Mahoney, observing that to do otherwise would unjustly
enrich her husband. Id. at 446, 419 A.2d at 1150. It is suggested that the premise underlying
the decision in Mahoney was that spousal contributions to the education of the other spouse
constitute investments in the marital partnership. See id.
The Mahoney court noted that Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); see
note 81 supra, merely held that enhanced earning capacity was not a distinct asset. 175 N.J.
Super. at 445, 419 A.2d at 1149-50. Consequently, the question of the intrinsic value of an
educational degree was an issue of first impression in the jurisdiction. Id. Concluding that
the educational degree was a property right, the court awarded the wife $5,000 as an "equi-
table offset." Id. at 447, 419 A.2d at 1150-51.
It is important to note that, as this issue went to press, Mahoney v. Mahoney was re-
versed. No. A-491-80-T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 9, 1982).
83 7 Faro. L. Rep. at 3007 (emphasis in original). Before arriving at its conclusion, the
court undertook a thorough examination of the precedent dealing with educational degrees
as marital property. Id. at 3002-06. The court rejected cases which require the absence of
traditional marital property as a prerequisite for the inclusion of a professional degree or
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the Lynn rationale is the forerunner of similar New Jersey
decisions.
New York also could include an educational degree within
marital assets subject to equitable distribution since the statute re-
quires the consideration Df "any equitable claim to, interest in, or
direct or indirect contribution made . . . to the career potential of
the other party. 8 4 Nonetheless, the Erie County Supreme Court
recently refused to subject a medical degree to equitable distribu-
tion because the degree had no inherent monetary value.5  Sub-
license since they produce divergent conceptual results. Id. at 3006. Cases providing implied
loan or unjust enrichment remedies also were rejected because they failed to compensate
adequately the working spouse. Id. Even the equitable offset cases did not satisfy the legiti-
mate expectations of the working spouse. Id. at 3007. Accordingly, the court subjected the
professional degree and license to distribution. Id.
If the value of a professional degree is held to be the increased earning potential, the
award may be determined by subtracting the earning capacity without the degree from the
earning capacity with the degree. Greene, Dissolution of the "Educational Partnership"
Marriage-Professional Degree as Divisible Marital Property, 4 FLA. B.J. 292, 296 (1981).
Due to such unforeseeable occurrences as premature death, disability, economic depression,
or a change in professions, this award often will be speculative and conjectural. Comment,
The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 590, 611
(1974).
The recovery also may be measured by calculating the financial contribution that the
working spouse made to obtain the educational degree. See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578
S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1979).
No speculation is required under this approach since the calculation rests on known vari-
ables such as tuition costs, fees, and living expenses. See Note, Professional Degree, supra
note 80, at 551; Comment, supra, at 603. The primary pitfall of a cost valuation is its failure
to recognize that the value of an education exceeds its cost. Thus, this valuation merely
reimburses the working spouse for previous support without providing the expected eco-
nomic benefit from the subsequent career professional. See Comment, supra, at 592. Histor-
ically, however, courts have considered the future earning capacity attributable to a degree
when assessing damages in tort actions. E.g., DeHass v. Pennsylvania R.R., 261 Pa. 499, 503,
104 A. 733, 734 (1918). Additionally, the same method may be applied in divorce actions.
See generally Denis, Sirman & Drinkwater, Wrongful Death Damages-Fair Compensation
for Future Pecuniary Loss Requires Consideration of Economic Trends and Income Tax
Consequences, 47 Miss. L.J. 173 (1976); Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impaired Earning
Capacity in Personal Injury Cases, 44 WASH. L. REv. 351 (1969). This has prompted one
commentator to note that "[tihe existence of valuable tools . . .demonstrates that future
earning capacity may be characterized as marital property without unmanageable diffi-
culty." 44 Mo. L. REv. 329, 336 (1979).
s N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) enables courts
to consider, "any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution
made . . . to the career or career potential of the other party." Id.; see id. § 236(B)(6)(a)(8)
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
81 Lesman v. Lesman, 110 Misc. 2d 815, 816, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1981). The Lesman court expressly rejected Lynn's holding that a medical license is
property subject to equitable distribution, stating that a medical license has no intrinsic
monetary value. Id. at 816-17, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 956. The court opined that it would be pa-
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sequent decisions which hold to the contrary will eventually con-
front the limited options available to the court when the degree-
winning spouse does not obtain a subsequent position of increased
income.86
Distributive Award
Occasionally, the situation will arise in a matrimonial case
where the traditional distribution of assets may be difficult. The
framers of the New York statute, therefore, included a unique pro-
vision permitting a distributive award in lieu of an actual distribu-
tion of property.87 Such a monetary award may be granted when a
court decides that an ordinary distribution, though possible, would
be burdensome or impractical, or where the distribution of a busi-
ness, corporation, or professional interest would be illegal.88 The
court has discretion to make this award to facilitate, supplement,
or effectuate an equitable distribution of marital property. 9 More-
over, such distributive award may be payable in a single sum or in
fixed periodic amounts.90 The statute stipulates that the payments
are not to be treated as ordinary income under the Internal Reve-
nue Code.91 Recently, the New York County Supreme Court em-
ployed this provision to distribute predominantly nonliquid assets
which could not be converted readily into cash.2
tently unreasonable to premise a financial obligation on a license which ultimately might
not be used by the licensee. Id. at 817, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 957. Any increased earnings gener-
ated by the professional degree, the court reasoned, should be translated into increased sup-
port or maintenance payments. Id. Finally, Justice Sedita noted that the pursuit of an edu-
cational degree is an individual effort. Id.
as The courts apparently focus on the enhanced earning capacity resulting from the
degree. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978). On this
reasoning, the valuation and award should remain the same regardless of whether the antici-
pated increased income materializes. If the terms of a periodic payment agreement become
unconscionable because of a failure to obtain profitable employment, courts should have the
power to rescind provisions of the agreement. Cf. Corcoron v. Corcoron, 73 App. Div. 2d
1037, 1038, 425 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (4th Dep't 1980) (provision in support agreement which
required a reduction in payments upon wife's employment found unconscionable and
rescinded).
87 See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
rId.
88 Id.
80 Id. § 236(B)(1)(b).
', Id. Under the Internal Revenue Code, alimony payments are treated as gross income
to the recipient, but are excluded from the payor's gross income. I.R.C. §§ 71(a)(1), 215(a).
This includes all periodic payments made under a divorce decree or a written instrument
pursuant to a divorce or separation. Id. § 71(a)(1).
82 Jolis v. Jolis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1981, at 11, col. 1 & at 12, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
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Postmarital Increases in Value
New York specifically exempts from equitable distribution the
appreciation in value of separate property unless the appreciation
is due partially to the contributions of the other spouse.9 5 The leg-
islature apparently intended to exclude services as a wage earner,
parent, spouse, homemaker, or any other career advancement fac-
tor from the category of spousal contributions toward the apprecia-
tion in value of separate property." Accordingly, an appreciation
in value of separate property will not be distributed to a spouse
who cannot "correlate how and in what manner her indirect
spousal efforts or services led to the appreciation in value" during
the marriage.9 5 By way of contrast, New Jersey exempts from equi-
table distribution any increase in value of separate property which
is attributable to the efforts of either spouse. 6
County). The nonliquid assets in Jolis included an equity interest in a New York coopera-
tive apartment, a French studio cooperative apartment used in the husband's European
business, and farm acreage which had been appraised for a potential sale in 1983. Id. Justice
Cohen ordered that all of the material property be distributed in equal portions over a 3-
year period. Id. at 12, col. 4.
93 N.Y. DoM. RmL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Governor Carey
recognized that upon dissolution of a marriage, "property accumulated during the marriage
should be distributed in a manner which reflects the individual needs and circumstances of
the parties regardless of the name in which such property is held." Memorandum of Gov.
Carey (June 22, 1980), reprinted in GuME TO NEw YORK EQUITABLE DISTRmUTMoN, supra
note 6, at 608. One of the considerations is "any ... direct or indirect contribution made to
the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, includ-
ing . . . contributions . . . as a spouse." N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(6). An appre-
ciation in value of separately held property, when due in part to contributions from a
spouse, apparently is considered as property acquired during the marriage. This view was
adopted in response to a concern that the services of a homemaker might be undervalued.
45 ALB. L. REV., supra note 11, at 492. Because New York's statute was designed to elimi-
nate previous injustices, it was necessary to recognize a spouse's contributions, as home-
maker or wage earner, during the marriage. Id.
Jolis v. Jolis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1981, at 11, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The Jolls
court observed that the legislature expressly omitted "spousal career advancement factors"
from characterization as contributions toward the appreciation in value of separate property
by including such factors exclusively in the provisions governing awards of maintenance and
distributions of marital property. Id. at 11, col. 6 & at 12, col. 1.
9 Id. at 12, col. 1. In Jolis, the wife claimed to have contributed to the appreciation in
value of her husband's stock interest in a closely held family corporation. Id. at 11, col. 5.
Her claim was premised on the social aid which she provided by serving as his homemaker
and frequent companion on global business trips. Id. at 12, col. 1. Deeming these efforts
speculative and indirect, the court concluded that the fluctuation in the value of the stock
was attributable to market and management factors. Id. Significantly, Mrs. Jolis never par-
ticipated directly in the business activities of the closely held corporation. Id.
" The increase in value of "separate" assets resulting after the marriage is eligible for
equitable distribution to the extent that the increase is attributable to the efforts of the
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Connecticut approaches this question from a different per-
spective. The statutory language directs the court to "consider the
contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation
or appreciation in value of their respective estates.117 There is no
significant case law to aid in further interpretation. Although the
statutory language allows the court broad discretion in determin-
ing which assets are subject to equitable distribution, it is silent as
to the distributability of spousal contributions which increase the
value of assets held by the other spouse.
VALUATION OF ASSETS
Assets subject to equitable distribution include interests in
closely held corporations, stocks, bonds, real estate, and cash. In-
deed, the parties have the obligation to supply sufficient informa-
tion to aid the court in the valuation of these assets.98 Conse-
other spouse subsequent to the marriage. Scherzer v. Scherzer, 136 N.J. Super. 397, 401, 346
A.2d 434, 436 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484
(1974), the court held that property owned by either spouse at the time of marriage enjoys
an immunity from equitable distribution and if such property increases in value, the incre-
ment also enjoys an immunity. Id. at 214, 320 A.2d at 493. The court cautioned, however,
that the immunity does not include increments in value attributable to the other spouse. Id.
at 214 n.4, 320 A.2d at 493 n.4. Increases in value of premarital assets due solely to inflation
are not subject to equitable distribution. Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J. Super. 5, 9, 370 A.2d 509, 510
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). For a concise list of premarital assets not eligible for equitable
distribution under New Jersey law, see Skoloff, The New Jersey Experience: Equitable Dis-
tribution from September 13, 1971 to June 1, 1980 in GUME TO NE w YORK EQUrrABLE Dis-
TRIBUTION, supra note 6, at 496-97.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1981).
9" Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J. Super. 267, 276, 372 A.2d 629, 633 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977), remanded, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 392 A.2d 621 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978); see Rothman
v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 233, 320 A.2d 496, 504 (1974); Franzese v. Franzese, 108 Misc. 2d
154, 157, 436 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1981). See generally Asnis,
Role of the Accountant in Matrimonial Cases, in GUIDE TO NEW YORK EQUITABLE DisTRmu-
TON, supra note 6, at 366-68. When the parties do not provide the court with sufficient
guidance to make the proper evaluation, the court has the authority to appoint its own
expert to secure appraisals. Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J. Super. at 276, 372 A.2d at 633; see
Gueli v. Gueli, 106 Misc. 2d 877, 878, 435 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-8(c) (West 1969) (in action to determine fair value of shares, court
in its discretion may appoint an appraiser). Indeed, New York views the cooperation of the
litigants essential to the disclosure process. See Wells v. Wells, 108 Misc. 2d 501, 502, 437
N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981) (defendant's contention that broad dis-
covery proceedings would be too costly rejected); Gueli v. Gueli, 106 Misc. 2d 877, 878, 435
N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981) (plaintiff awarded $500 to employ an
accountant to evaluate defendant's business records); Roussos v. Roussos, 106 Misc. 2d 583,
587, 434 N.Y.S.2d 600, 603 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1980) (wife entitled to disclosure of
entire financial history of marriage); Stolowitz v. Stolowitz, 106 Misc. 2d 853, 859, 435
N.Y.S.2d 882, 886-87 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980) (defendant's participation in discovery
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quently, the equitable distribution award usually will be based
upon what the court perceives to be the most realistic valuation.9
Often, however, the valuation of assets is the most difficult ques-
tion confronting a matrimonial court.
The New Jersey courts have held that the book value of a
closely held corporation may not be its actual value. 100 Moreover,
neither the assessed value nor the dividend income is considered
an accurate measurement of the market value of a close corpora-
tion. 101 Rather, New Jersey law has favored the use of the guide-
proceeding to value partnership interest made it unnecessary to require disclosure of law
firm's clients).
" See Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 199, 392 A.2d 621, 627 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1978); Mandel v. Mandel, 109 Misc. 2d 1, 3-4, 439 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1981); Gramazio v. Gramazio, 108 Misc. 2d 579, 580, 438 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct.
Rockland County 1981). In refusing to allow a jury trial on the issue of equitable distribu-
tion, the Mandel court stated that since a matrimonial action was an action in equity, the
court must be permitted "to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the case." 109 Misc. 2d
at 2, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (citation omitted). Thus, the valuation of marital property is
within the discretion of the trial judge. Similarly, the Lavene court noted that "[tihe weight
to be accorded to the testimony of [expert] witnesses . . . depends upon the ability of the
witness, his knowledge and his experience in the field." 162 N.J. Super. at 199, 392 A.2d at
627 (citation omitted).
1o0 Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J. Super. 267, 275, 372 A.2d 629, 633 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977); see Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 444-45, 393 A.2d 583, 587-88
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). Contra, Esposito v. Esposito, 158 N.J. Super. 285, 293, 385 A.2d
1266, 1270 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). The book value of the corporation rarely is indica-
tive of its true market value because the assets are recorded at cost and many assets are
omitted for tax purposes. See Fishman, Basic Principles of Closely-Held Stock Valuation,
in GUIDE TO NEW YORK EQUITABLE DISTRmUTION, supra note 6, at 380. See also ATTORNEY'S
HANDBOOK OF AcCOUNTING §§ 4.02[11]-4.02[12] (H. Sellin 3d ed. 1979); J. BONBRIGHT, VALU-
ATION OF PROPERTY 265 (1937). Accordingly, a closely held corporation cannot be evaluated
realistically under the simplistic book value approach since it fails to consider goodwill, "the
investment value of a business in terms of actual profit," and the discounting of minority
shareholders' interests. Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J. Super. at 275, 372 A.2d at 633. Neverthe-
less, in Esposito v. Esposito, 158 N.J. Super. 285, 385 A.2d 1266 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978),
the court used the book value to determine valuation. Id. at 293, 385 A.2d at 1270. The
court, however, noted that it was impelled to accept the book value as the fair valuation
because of the circumstances of the cases and the absence of competent expert testimony.
Id.
101 Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 196, 392 A.2d 621, 625 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978) (citing Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 241); Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d.
311, 318, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584, 589 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981); cf. Gemignani v. Gemignani,
146 N.J. Super. 278, 283, 369 A.2d 942, 944-45 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (trial court erred
in accepting assessed valuation of two-family house as the fair market value and in failing to
consider "the income-production aspect of the marital residence vis-a-vis asset value").
Dividends also do not provide a reliable indication of fair market value because past
dividends may not bear any relation to present dividend-paying capacity. Rev. Rul. 59-60,
1959-1 C.B. 237, 241. This is especially true in the case of a closely held corporation when an
individual or group might continue dividend payments to meet stockholder needs. 162 N.J.
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lines enumerated in Revenue Ruling 59-60.112 Thus, an appraiser
must consider carefully the corporation's nature and history, eco-
nomic outlook, book value, financial condition, earning capacity,
dividend paying capacity, past sales, blockage, goodwill, the mar-
ket price of competitive stocks, and other intangible assets.103 The
weight accorded each of these factors will depend upon the facts of
the particular case.10 4
at 196, 392 A.2d at 625 (citing Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 241). For example, the
controlling individual or group could substitute salaries and bonuses for dividends, thereby
reducing net income and understating the dividend-paying capacity. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1
C.B. at 241; see Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 318, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584, 589
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981). When dividends are employed in the valuation analysis,
therefore, primary consideration should be given to the dividend-paying capacity of the
firm, rather than to the historical record of payment. 162 N.J. at 196, 392 A.2d at 625 (citing
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. at 241); see GUmE TO NEW YORK EQurrABLE DIsTRIBUTION,
supra note 6, at 382.
102 See Westfield Center Serv., Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 86 N.J. 453, 466, 432 A.2d 48,
55 (1981); Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 193, 392 A.2d 621, 624 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1978). New York also adopted the guidelines set forth in Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 in
"what appears to have been the first trial of a matrimonial action under ... 'equitable
distribution' law." Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 311, 316-17, 437 N.Y.S.2d
584, 586, 588-89 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981).
103 Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 193-94, 392 A.2d 621, 624 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1978) (citing Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238-39). Under the capitalization of
earnings method, ownership of a closely held corporation is valued by capitalizing earnings
at a reasonable return on investment which is based on relative risk and current interest
rates. 162 N.J. at 197, 392 A.2d at 626 (citing Lawinger, Appraising Closely-Held
Stock-Valuation Methods and Concepts, 110 TRUSTs & EsT. 816, 817 (1971)). The capital-
ization rate will vary in each case depending on the nature of the business, the risk involved,
and the stability or irregularity of the earnings. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. at 243. In
another method of valuaton, price earnings ratios of the closely held corporation are com-
pared to those of publicly traded companies in the same or comparable industries. 162 N.J.
at 198, 392 A.2d at 626 (citing Lawinger, supra, at 818-19). Despite the difficulties posed by
the degree of comparability between the companies and the weight to be accorded the evi-
dence obtained, this method is preferable to selecting a pure earnings ratio based entirely on
the assessment of risk and a judgment regarding the requirement for return on investment.
Id. The final approach to valuation, an appraisal of all underlying assets with adjustments
for existing liabilities, can serve as a check on the two previous methods. 162 N.J. at 198-99,
392 A.2d at 626-27 (citing Lawinger, supra, at 818-19). Basically this approach involves a
summation of the assets.
104 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f) (1981). Courts have accorded various weights to the
factors depending upon the property valued and circumstances involved. See, e.g., Lavene v.
Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 201-02, 392 A.2d 621, 628 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (in evalu-
ating electronics business court gave weight to expert testimony of recent decline in elec-
tronics industry); Esposito v. Esposito, 158 N.J. Super. 285, 292-93, 385 A.2d 1266, 1270
(Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (book value used because of absence of competent expert testi-
mony as to value of auto dealership); Franzese v. Franzese, 108 Misc. 2d 154, 157, 436
N.Y.S.2d 979,.982 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1981) (court concluded that an adequate
determination of business interests could be performed based on an examination of books
and records); Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 321, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584, 591 (Sup.
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An appraiser also must consider the methods of valuation
which have been derived from the Revenue Ruling:
1. Capitalization of Earnings: The company's value as a going
concern is measured by the capitalization of indicated earnings at
a reasonable return on investment based on relative risk and cur-
rent interest rates.
2. Comparison with P/E Ratios of Comparable Firms: The com-
pany's ratio of price earnings is compared to those of publicly-
traded companies in the same or comparable industry. Adjust-
ments are first made to compensate for differences between such
companies and the company being appraised.
3. Value of Assets: All underlying assets, tangible and intangi-
ble, are appraised with existing liabilities subtracted. 10
When evaluating a service business, one must examine net earn-
ings and compare them to the personal services which produced
them.0 6 The Revenue Ruling approach also is applicable to valua-
tions of corporate stocks. 107 It may be used for valuation of any
type of business interest, including partnerships, proprietorships,
and intangible assets.108 New Jersey employs the Revenue Ruling
factors when valuating these assets for equitable distribution. 10 9
Ct. Nassau County 1981) (record of value acceptable for valuation purposes).
105 See Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 197-98, 392 A.2d 621, 626 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1978).
10" Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 547, 397 A.2d 374, 376 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978);
see, e.g., Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 318, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584, 589 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1981). Because of the service nature of one spouse's medical practice, there
was little capital outlay involved in establishing it. 108 Misc. 2d at 320-21, 437 N.Y.S.2d at
590-91. Since the equipment used had little resale value, an evaluation based on return of
capital or the value of net assets would be inappropriate. Id. at 318, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
The court determined that earnings could be calculated by subtracting the reasonable com-
pensation for services from that which was actually paid. Id.
107 Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327, 328. A number of courts have applied the stan-
dards set out in Revenue Ruling 59-60 to the question of corporate stock valuation. E.g.,
Newcomer v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1368, 1368-70 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (valuation of stock
for estate purposes); Andrews v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 459, 462 (1976) (valuation
of stock for liquidation loss purposes). In Righter v. United States, 439 F.2d 1204 (Ct. Cl.
1971), the court listed as factors to be considered in valuing stock the corporate assets,
earnings, dividend policy, earning power prospects, book value, management, competition,
and other factors. Id. at 1218 (citing Arc Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 98, 103 (8th
Cir. 1961)).
101 Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327, 328.
'09 Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345-47, 331 A.2d 257, 260-61 (1975) (value of the hus-
band's partnership interest carried on the books of his law firm included in the distribution
of assets); Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 554-55, 397 A.2d 374, 380-81 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1978) (no good will in the law practice of the husband to be included in distribution
where his net income for the past 6 years did not exceed the reasonable value of his ser-
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In what has been characterized as a "maiden voyage," a New
York court recently addressed the question of which factors may
be considered in determining a spouse's interest in a closely held
corporation. Relying on the Revenue Ruling factorsfor purposes of
valuation, the Nassau County Supreme Court held that an ex-wife
was entitled to one-fourth of her husband's interest in a closely
held corporation." 0
In addition to the Revenue Ruling factors, a bona fide buy-sell
agreement which predates the marital discord also should prove
acceptable in the valuation of the stock of a professional closely
held corporation."' An agreement which places a value on the cor-
poration in the event of the death of a stockholder is made by the
stockholding spouse contemplating the disposition of his estate.112
Since this valuation is set by the shareholder spouse at a time
when he was endeavoring to protect his estate from those within
vices); Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J. Super. 267, 274, 372 A.2d 629, 632 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977) (subtraction of the value of good will from the computation of the husband's business
interest held to be reversible error).
110 Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 322-23, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584, 592 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1981). The question of valuation has been addressed by other jurisdictions.
E.g., Miranda v. Miranda, 596 S.W.2d 61, 62-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). In Miranda, for in-
stance, a family-owned corporation was valued by computing the value of the corporation's
good will and adding that to the book value. Id. at 63; see Webb v. Webb, 94 Cal. App. 3d
335, 344-45, 156 Cal. Rptr. 334, 339-40 (Ct. App. 1979) (valuation of a business which fell
between the nominal market value testified to and the computation of the value of good will
by a capitalization of excess earnings method held correct); Lockwood v. Lockwood, 205
Neb. 818, 821, 290 N.W.2d 636, 640 (1980) (valuation of good will of the husband's account-
ing practice at $300,000 held to be correct); Hinrichs v. Hinrichs, 37 Or. App. 833, 834, 588
P.2d 130, 131 (Ct. App. 1978) (valuation of business that exceeded its book value held cor-
rect); In re Marriage of Freedman, 23 Wash. App. 27, 28, 592 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Ct. App.
1979) (factors to be included in valuing the good will of a law practice included the practi-
tioner's health, age, reputation, earning power, and comparative success). The Nehorayoff
court applied the capitalization of net earnings approach, determining the capitalization
rate to be 25%, based on the nature, risks, past performances, and future prospects of the
personal service corporation. Id. at 319-21, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 590-91; see Foster v. Foster, 42
Cal. App. 3d 577, 581-84, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52-54 (Ct. App. 1974). See generally 1 A. DEw-
ING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONs 379-82 (5th ed. 1953).
"I A restrictive agreement may serve to fix the value of corporate stock in a closely
held business for estate tax purposes. Weil v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1267, 1273-74 (1954);
see Comment, Valuaton of Shares in a Closely Held Corporation, 47 Miss. L.J. 715, 716 n.4
(1976). By analogy, the value established by a buy-sell agreement may prove equally satis-
factory for distribution purposes.
112 In Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975), a law firm kept records of the
value of partnership interests payable on any partner's death. Id. at 346, 331 A.2d at 260.
The court upheld the trial court's use of that value along with the value of the husband's
capital account as the presumptive value of the husband's partnership interest. Id. at 346,
331 A.2d at 261.
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the corporation, it provides a reliable indication of the value of his
interest, especially when the other stockholders have been reluc-
tant to cooperate.
The valuation of a professional corporation involves unique
considerations. Unlike other business entities, the professional cor-
poration generally has few assets and high income. 1 ' Generally,
the assets to be valued include accounts receivable, goodwill, and
tangible assets such as office equipment, furniture, and a building
or lease. Liabilities such as accounts and notes payable must be
subtracted from this valuation. Currently, the most widely ac-
cepted method of valuation for professional corporations is com-
parative sales for similar corporations." 4
An independent valuation will be the most persuasive evi-
dence of the value of a closely held corporation. 115 Prudent estate
planning is required to analyze the alternatives available to mini-
mize potentially adverse tax consequences. 1 6 To achieve this end,
an increasing number of matrimonial practitioners are relying on
professional expertise in the areas of accounting and estates.
DETERMINING AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
As previously noted, defining property as marital or separate
is merely the initial consideration in arriving at an equitable distri-
11 Professional corporations provide services of a personal nature. As such, their in-
comes are guaranteed by the individuals in the corporation rather than by the tangible as-
sets. See 3B J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION § 22.50, at 399-400 (1980).
114 See Estate of Piper v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062, 1072-74, 1084-86 (1979); Estate
of Goodrich v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062, 1071-79 (1978); Estate of Hall v. Com-
missioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 648, 655-56 (1975). See also I.R.C. § 2031(b); Treas. Reg. §
20.2031-2(f)(2) (1981); Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B., 237.
15 Welch, Discovery and Valuation in a Divorce Division Involving a Closely-Held
Business or Professional Practice, 7 COMM. PROP. J. 103, 104-05 (1980); see G. DESMOND &
R. KELLEY, BUSINESS VALUATION HANDBOOK § 1.05-3, at 12 (1977) (professional appraisal
may be sole method of securing objective valuation). See generally Schreier & Joy, Judicial
Valuation of "Close" Corporation Stock: Alice in Wonderland Revisited, 31 OKLA. L. REv.
853, 857 (1978); Comment, supra note 111, at 742.
"' Hardee, The Valuation of a Closely-Held Business (pt. 1), 5 ALI-ABA COURSE
MATERIALS J. 35, 35-37 (1981). See generally Penner, Lifetime Estate Planning for the Op-
eration of a Closely Held Corporation, 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1538 (1976); Note, Estate
Planning for the Close Corporation, 51 MINN. L. REv. 725, 725 (1967). Prudent estate plan-
ning is critical in certain instances. The stock value may require an increase to qualify as a
redemption under I.R.C. § 303 or to reach the threshold for installment payment of death
taxes under I.R.C. §§ 6166, 6166A. See Hardee, supra, at 36-37. For an analysis of the vari-
ous alternatives available to the taxpayer in valuing a closely held corporation, see Lowell,
Warren & Zabel, Estate Planning for Owners of Closely-Held Businesses (pts. 1 & 2); 3
ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J., 19-20, 37, 37-62 (1978).
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bution. Generally, a court is required to distribute property in a
manner that is fair and just, considering all of the circumstances.
In carrying forth this procedure, all three states are guided by spe-
cifically enumerated guidelines.
Trial Court Guidelines
These guidelines have been outlined by case law in New
Jersey. In Painter v. Painter, the New Jersey Supreme Court ap-
proved a list of thirteen criteria.117 Additionally, the New Jersey
courts have adopted section 37 of the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act.1 8 Similar criteria are set forth by statute in New York
and Connecticut. ' e In the absence of an agreement, the New York
statute directs a court to consider ten nonwaivable factors. 20 Con-
necticut's guidelines consist of sixteen interrelated factors.'21
1,, Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 211, 320 A.2d 484, 492 (1974). The Painter court
noted that the 13 criteria were illustrative but not exhaustive of the permissible considera-
tions. The matrimonial judge should consider the respective age, background and earning
ability of the parties, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living during marriage,
the money or property brought into the marriage by each spouse, the present income of the
parties, the property acquired during the marriage by either or both of the parties, the
source of the acquisition, the current value and income producing capacity of the property,
the debts and liabilities of the parties, the present mental and physical health of the parties,
the probability of continued employment at present or increased earnings, the effect of dis-
tribution on the ability to pay alimony and child support, and interspousal gifts during
marriage. The Painter decision noted that the trial judge must consider all of the individual
circumstances. Id. at 212, 320 A.2d at 492.
' See Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 194, 320 A.2d 478, 483 (1974). UNIFoRM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (UMDA) § 307. The UMDA recognizes that marriage is a part-
nership in which each spouse makes different albeit equally important contributions. IL
LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 164 (1969).
The Act was recommended to the American Bar Association in 1970 and approved in 1974.
See 60 A.B.A.J. 446, 451 (1974). A 1973 amendment to the original section 307 created two
alternatives. Alternative A proceeds upon the principle that all property should be regarded
as marital assets available for distribution. Alternative B was included at the insistence of
several commissioners from community property states who preferred to adhere to the dis-
tinction between community property and separate property. See UMDA § 307 (commis-
sioner's comment 1973).
New Jersey has adopted alternative B primarily because it specifies that equitable dis-
tribution should take place without regard to marital misconduct. See Chalmers v. Chal-
mers, 65 N.J. 186, 193-94, 320 A.2d 478, 482-83 (1974) ("[tihe concept of fault is not rele-
vant to such distribution since all that is being affected is the allocation to each party of
what really belongs to him or her").
:I' See notes 124-127 infra.
120 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see note 11
supra.
121 Connecticut's guideline criteria, enumerated in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1981),
consist of 16 interrelated factors. The factors to be considered are: the length of the mar-
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Upon a cursory examination, the reader may appreciate the
basic similarities among the three sets of guidelines. Some differ-
ences, however, do exist. The Painter guidelines, for example, refer
to the importance of interspousal gifts, 12 2 whereas no such refer-
ence is found in the New York or Connecticut guidelines. Connect-
icut has distinguished itself by adding the contribution of each
party in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value of
their respective estates as a consideration. 2 '
It is clear that New York studied the successes and failures of
its neighbors in framing its guidelines. The New York statute in-
cludes three factors not mentioned in either Connecticut or New
Jersey. One factor takes into account the loss of inheritance or
pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage. 2 Another factor
considers the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any compo-
nent asset or distributing any interest in a business, corporation, or
profession. 125 It also considers the economic desirability of retain-
riage; the causes for annulment, dissolution of marriage or legal separation; the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income; the vocational skills, employability, es-
tate liabilities, and needs of each party; and the opportunity for future acquisition of capital
assets and income. The court also must "consider the contribution of each of the parties in
the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates." Id.
122 The Painter guidelines make reference to the importance of interspousal gifts,
Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 211, 320 A.2d 484, 492 (1974), while no such reference is
found in the comparable New York or Connecticut guidelines.
123 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1981).
121 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The loss of
inheritance rights is related to N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170-a (McKinney 1977), which was
enacted in response to the Court of Appeals decision in Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28,
256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970). Gleason held that the 1966 Divorce Reform Act
should be applied retroactively, thus allowing a.separation agreement executed in 1954 to be
converted into a divorce in 1970 even though it meant that one spouse would be deprived of
expected inheritance rights. Id. at 36, 256 N.E.2d at 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 352. The court of
appeals stated that if the loss of a prospective right of inheritancy was inequitable, then the
situation should be remedied by the legislature. Id. at 43, 256 N.E.2d at 521, 308 N.Y.S.2d
at 357. Five years later, the legislature enacted section 170-a which provided that a defen-
dant in conversion divorce predicated on a separation decree or agreement obtained or exe-
cuted before January 21, 1970, may recover a sum equivalent "to the value of any economic
and property rights of which the spouse was deprived by virtue of [the conversion divorce],
except where the grounds for the separation judgment would have excluded recovery of eco-
nomic and property rights." N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170-a (McKinney 1977).
"I N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(9) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). This factor
must be read in conjunction with subsection 5(e) which .states:
In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is
appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of
an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the
court in lieu of such equitable distributions shall make a distributive award in
order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may
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ing such an asset or interest free from any claim or interference by
the other party.12 This factor is part of the aforementioned dis-
tributive award provision. Despite the specificity of the statute,
New York leaves some discretion to the courts by the inclusion of a
provision which allows the court to consider "any other factor
which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.M2 7
Role of Marital Fault
Under the common law, marital fault was an integral part of
any proceeding to determine property rights upon divorce. While
statutory reform has mitigated the harshness of the common law,
the attitudes associated with the earlier law may be slow in chang-
ing. The resulting situation renders the role of marital fault un-
clear. What follows is a clarification of the current situation.
Marital fault is not expressly mentioned in New York's stat-
ute. It is possible, however, in a case where grievous marital mis-
make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of
marital property.
Id. § 236(B)(5)(e). Although the distributive award technique is useful in instances where it
is more advantageous to keep an economic asset intact, it does not eliminate the need to
make an evaluation of the worth of the interest in the business, corporation, or profession in
question.
126 See note 125 supra.
127 N.Y. DoM. Ran. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The "wild
card" provision was the result of compromises regarding the relevance of marital miscon-
duct. See Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, supra note 6, at 49. Although
marital fault expressly was excluded from the initial drafts of subdivisions five and six, re-
garding child support, the compromise resulted in the deletion of the express exclusion. Id.
One New York court asserted that the "wild card" provision authorized the equitable
division of property between the spouses. Kobylack v. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d 402, 405, 442
N.Y.S.2d 392, 394 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1981). In Kobylack, the court determined
that the husband and wife contributed to the marital expenses in a 2.5 to 1 ratio. Id. at 408,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 395. Consequently, the court declared that the property in question should
be divided in accordance with that ratio. Id. The court also noted that although marital
misconduct may be considered in the division of property, apparently pursuant to the "wild
card" provision, that factor was inapplicable in the instant case. Id.
While the aforementioned criteria form the basic considerations given by the respective
courts, they are not exclusive. The Connecticut statutory guidelines have been supple-
mented by subsequent case law. See, e.g., Posada v. Jacobson, 177 Conn. 259, 413 A.2d 854,
856 (1979); Aguire v. Aguire, 171 Conn. 312, 370 A.2d 948, 949 (1976); An analysis of the
Connecticut courts' application of the statutory criteria may be found in Gordon, Connecti-
cut Alimony and Property Law, in GumE TO NE W YORK EQurrABLE DIsTRmUTON, supra
note 6, at 541.
New York may rely on case law and statutory guidelines developed in other jurisdic-
tions for guidance in construing its statute. The difficulty, however, lies in predicting which
precedents the New York courts will follow. 45 ALB. L. REv., supra note 11, at 507.
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conduct is a material factor, fault may be considered as a "factor
which the court shall expressly find just and proper."""8 As a lead-
ing commentator explained upon the unveiling of the New York
statute, however, the purpose of the new law is to determine eco-
nomic justice and not to punish marital fault.12 Despite this ad-
monition, the Suffolk County Supreme Court recently held that
marital fault may be considered when distributing marital prop-
erty, though it may not preclude such an award.130 Additionally,
the Nassau County Supreme Court has concluded that the axioms
of equity have not been abrogated by the new equitable distribu-
tion law.13' Consequently, the court refused to award any share in
the marital premises to a husband who had come into court with
unclean hands." 2 Unless its unusual nature requires that the assets
be given to the innocent spouse, marital fault may not be consid-
ered in New Jersey. 33 Connecticut courts have held that fault may
128 See note 127 supra.
129 Since section 236 operates on the premise that marriage is an economic partnership,
the distribution of marital property and the determination of maintenance should rest
largely upon financial need and ability, irrespective of marital fault. Foster, An Explanation
of the New York 1980 Equitable Distribution Law, 6 Fam. L. Rep. 2651, 2651 (1981). Unlike
the predecessor section, which contained a provision that automatically barred alimony if
the spouse was guilty of misconduct, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977), the
amended section does not include marital fault as a consideration when distributing prop-
erty or awarding maintenance. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 236(B)(5)(C)(1)-(10), 236(B)
(6)(9)(1)-(10) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
Nevertheless, marital fault may be considered when it is "heinous or grevious miscon-
duct of a flagrant character." Foster, supra, at 2653; see N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§
236(B)(5)(d)(10), 236(B)(6)(a)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Yet, in Bofinger v. Bof-
inger, 107 Misc. 2d 573, 435 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1981), the court denied a
spouse relief under the equitable doctrine of clean hands. Id. at 576, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
110 Giannola v. Giannola, 109 Misc. 2d 985, 987, 441 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1981); see Kobylack v. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d 402, 408, 442 N.Y.S. 2d 392, 395
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1981). The Giannola court premised its holding on the theory
that each spouse was entitled to receive whatever he contributed to the marital partnership.
109 Misc. 2d at 987, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (citing Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 194, 320
A.2d 478, 483 (1974)).
"I1 Whelan v. Whelan, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1981, at 12, col. 5, 6 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County).
132 Id.
133 Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 193, 320 A.2d 478, 482 (1974). The Chalmers
court held that an adulterous relationship should not be considered when distributing mari-
tal property. Id. at 193-94, 320 A.2d at 482-83. The court reasoned that it may be impossible
to ascertain who should bear the responsibility for the marital discord when the "fault" is
merely a manifestation of an unhealthy relationship. Id. at 193, 320 A.2d at 482. Addition-
ally, the court observed that equitable distribution is merely a reallocation of a spouse's
contribution toward the acquisition of marital property and fault is irrelevant to such a
distribution. Id. at 194, 320 A.2d at 482. Finally, the court noted that section 307 of the
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be raised in marital dissolution actions for the purpose of estab-
lishing spousal obligations.8
Economic fault often is a question before the court. Generally,
economic fault will arise when one spouse has depleted the assets
for purely personal acquisitions. A court which is presented with
this problem may choose to place the depleted assets among that
spouse's list of assets if the remaining assets are sufficient to com-
pensate the innocent spouse. Typically, however, the guilty spouse
has depleted most, if not all, of the assets subject to equitable dis-
tribution, thereby leaving nothing to be distributed to the other
spouse. In this situation, a court may require the judicial sale of
the asset which was acquired with the marital asset or its proceeds
in order to compensate the other spouse.13 5
Uniform Marriages and Divorce Act "provides for the distribution of marital property 'with-
out regard to marital conduct."' Id.
In D'Arc v. D'Arc, 164 N.J. Super. 226, 395 A.2d 1270 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 175 N.J. Super. 598, 421 A.2d 602 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), a
wealthy wife proved by a preponderance of the credible evidence that her husband had
attempted to murder her. 164 N.J. Super. at 237, 395 A.2d at 1276. In holding that marital
fault should be considered in distributing the marital property, the court indicated that the
husband in D'Arc contributed only insignificantly to the marriage. Thus, there was no mari-
tal estate. Id. at 241, 395 A.2d at 1278. More importantly, however, the fault involved in
D'Arc was "so evil and outrageous" as to "shock the conscience of everyone." Id. Concluding
that there was no absolute statutory bar prohibiting the consideration of fault in the distri-
bution of marital assets, the court held that equity dictated that the vast majority of the
assets be distributed to the wife. Id. at 243, 395 A.2d at 1279.
1' E.g., Edge v. Commissioner of Welfare, 34 Conn. Supp. 284, 388 A.2d 1193, 1194-95
(C.P. 1978); see Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 569, 427 A.2d 406, 408 (1980). Although
marriage may terminate without regard to fault, 179 Conn. at 569, 427 A.2d at 408 (citing
Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 256, 423 A.2d 895, 896 (1979)), "no-fault divorce does not mean
that the causes of a marital break-up are always irrelevant." 179 Conn. at 569, 427 A.2d at
408. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)-82 (1975), enables a trial court to consider "the causes for the
annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation" when deciding if alimony should
be awarded. Id.
135 Unlike marital fault, which involves misconduct of a spouse giving rise to a separa-
tion or divorce, economic fault concerns the attempt by one spouse to frustrate the other
spouse's right to equitable distribution or maintenance. It is not the immorality of the
spouse's act which warrants investigation, but the adverse economic impact on the family
partnership which results from the squandering of marital assets. Because marriage is
viewed as a partnership, unjust enrichment will result unless the wasteful dissipation of
marital assets is considered when distributing the partnership assets. Foster, Commentary
on Equitable Distribution, supra note 6, at 58. Ensuring that the legal duty to support is
fulfilled should be the objective. Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn. 742, 345 A.2d 21, 25 (1974); cf.
Hotkowski v. Hotkowski, 165 Conn. 167, 170, 328 A.2d 674, 676 (1973) (primary basis for
alimony award is continuing support of wife). Ten states presently include economic mis-
conduct as a factor in determining an award of property, maintenance or alimony. Freed &
Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States, supra note 1, at 248 (Table I1I - 3(c)). For statutory
schemes which permit the court to consider the wasteful dissipation of the family assets in a
1982]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:219
Role of the Homemaker
New York statutorily characterizes the role of the homemaker
as a marital contribution.3 8 Thus, it must be considered with the
earning spouse's income contribution in making an equitable dis-
tribution award. The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a similar
rule when it approved section 37 of the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act.137 In Connecticut, however, statutory and case law are
divorce proceeding, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(6) (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a)(9) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Interestingly, New York allows
consideration of economic fault when determining maintenance, see N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw §
236(B)(6)(a)(9) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982), but omits it as an express factor to be consid-
ered when determining the distribution of marital assets. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236
(B)(5)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). One commentator has stated that economic fault
may be considered when determining the equitable distribution under N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 256 (B)(5)(d)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (any other factor the court deems just and
proper). Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, supra note 6, at 49-51.
If a spouse attempts to frustrate the other spouse's equitable share of the marital assets
through a fraudulent sale of the assets, the aggrieved spouse may obtain a temporary re-
straining order mandating that the marital assets not be significantly disturbed or reorga-
nized. Froelich-Switzer v. Switzer, 107 Misc. 2d 814, 814-15, 436 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1981). Injunctive relief will be granted in special circumstances when the
spouse seeking the injunctive relief shows the likelihood of ultimate victory and proves that
the injunction is vital to prevent irreparable injury by the other spouse. See deKwiatkowski
v. deKwiatkowski, N.Y.L.J., May 7, 1981, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County) (issuance of an
injunction does not place any "unreasonable restraint or unduly heavy burden" on the par-
ties as long as they are treated equally); Bisca v. Bisca, 108 Misc. 2d 227, 230, 437 N.Y.S.2d
258, 260 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981) (injunctive relief is a drastic remedy that should be
used sparingly and only to prevent threatened acts); Annexstein v. Annexstein, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 24, 1981, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Kings County) (nothing in the equitable distribution
statute deprives an equity court of traditional powers of injunctive relief); Franzese v.
Franzese, 108 Misc. 2d 154, 157, 436 N.Y.S.2d 979, 981 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1981)
(injunctive relief denied due to the absence of facts showing imminence of feared activity).
186 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Section
236(B)(5)(d)(6) provides that the court in distributing marital property may consider
"[a]ny . . . contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not
having title . . .including services as a spouse." Id. Additionally, the New York statute
provides that the contribution for spouses as homemakers also must be considered when
determining maintenance awards. Id. § 236(B)(6)(a)(8).
" Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 211-12, 320 A.2d 484, 492 (1974). Painter included
section 307 of the UMDA in its list of illustrative factors. See note 118 supra. Alternatives A
and B of section 307 require the consideration of the contribution of a spouse as a home-
maker in apportioning property. UMDA § 307, reprinted in 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
(1979). Indeed, the equitable distribution statutes have at least one common purpose:
[They seek] to right what many have felt to be a grave wrong. [They give]
recognition to the essential supportive role played by the wife in the home, ac-
knowledging that as a homemaker, wife and mother she should clearly be entitled
to a share of family assets accumulated during the marriage.
Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 320 A.2d 496, 501 (1974); see Brandenburg v. Bran-
denburg, 83 N.J. 198, 210, 416 A.2d 327, 333. (1980); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 174 N.J. Super.
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silent on this subject. The lack of commentary has led some au-
thorities to conclude that no comparable recognition of the home-
maker rule exists in Connecticut.38
Judicial Discretion in Determining An Award
Indisputably, the most important factor in an equitable distri-
bution is judicial discretion. All three states have recognized the
prominence of judicial discretion in the implementation of what
essentially is a doctrine of fairness.1 3 9 They have, however, ap-
107, 113, 415 A.2d 1174, 1177-78 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). In Gibbons, the court ex-
panded on the partnership theory of marriage enunciated in Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J.
219, 229, 320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (1974). The court reasoned that the noneconomic duties that
the homemaker contributes to the marital relationship are as imperative to the partnership
as any economic factors. 174 N.J. Super. at 113, 415 A.2d at 1177-78. Recognizing that the
equitable distribution award must be based on the totality of the contributions made to the
marital partnership, the court concluded that equitable distribution "gives recognition to
the essential supportive role played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that as home-
maker, wife and mother, she should clearly be entitled to a share of family assets accumu-
lated during the marriage." 174 N.J. at 113, 415 A.2d at 1175. See also Burch, supra note
51, at 110-14; Hauserman & Fethke, supra note 51, at 250-61. For cases regarding the evalu-
ation of homemaker services in other jurisdictions, see In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal.
3d 437, 453, 573 P.2d 41, 52, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139, 150 (1978); Eschenburg v. Eschenburg, 171
Mont. 247, 557 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1976).
138 See generally Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States, supra note 1, at 246
(Table III); see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 46b-81(c) (West Supp. 1981). See also UMDA § 307.
For a detailed list of states containing "homemaker provisions," see D. FaE, Factors For
Equitable Distribution, in GumE TO NEw YORK EQurrABLE DIsTmurIoN, supra note 6, at
201-03.
139 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81(c) (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-
23 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1981-
1982). In the early case of German v. German, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated:
In New York State as with us, divorce, with its incident of alimony, is a creature
of statute .... It does not, however, follow that an action for divorce is one at
law. The Legislature can create equitable rights and provide equitable remedies as
well as it can those cognizable in the law courts. Obviously the relief given in a
divorce action is not such as could be granted in a common-law court, but is es-
sentially equitable in its nature.
122 Conn. 155, 160, 188 A. 429, 431 (1936) (citations omitted). This traditional view of equi-
table relief in matrimonial proceedings has been reafirmed under the modem Connecticut
statute. See, e.g., Krause v. Krause, 174 Conn. 361, 363, 387 A.2d 548, 550 (1978) (trial court
did not abuse discretion in excluding evidence of possible future inheritance); Rodearmel v.
Rodearmel, 173 Conn. 273, 274, 377 A.2d 260, 262 (1977) (per curiam) (no abuse of discre-
tion in allowing husband to amend complaint to add new claim assigning the wife's interest
in marital residence to him, awarding only one dollar a year as alimony). Similarly, New
Jersey decisional law also recognizes the role of judicial discretion in implementing its equi-
table distribution law. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 360, 371 A.2d 1, 6 (1977);
Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 443, 393 A.2d 583, 587 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978) (no restrictions on courts with regard to ordering distribution in kind of eligible assets
or awarding monetary equivalent thereof).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:219
proached the method of allocation in different ways. 40
Due to the general language of the Connecticut statute, trial
judges are afforded broad discretion in the equitable distribution
of marital assets.' 41 The Connecticut courts have supported this
view, recognizing that trial courts "have a distinct advantage over
an Appellate Court" when resolving property disputes.142 Notably,
an abuse of discretion will not be found unless the conclusion of
the trial court was not rationally based. 143 Moreover, a trial court
need not recite the statutory language of the factors considered in
reaching its conclusion provided that the decision as a whole
clearly indicated that they were appropriately taken into ac-
count.14 4 In addition, the trial court is not obligated to make con-
clusory findings regarding each of the statutory considerations.
Finally, a Connecticut court may order the transfer of an interest
in a jointly held marital home as part of an alimony award even
In Gibbons v. Gibbons, 174 N.J. Super. 107, 415 A.2d 1174 (App. Div. 1980), both
spouses were independently wealthy. Emphasizing that each spouse had been "supportive"
of the other's needs during the marriage, the court stated that "neither need nor direct
contribution to the acquisition of assets is in any measure a dispositive factor." Id. at 114,
415 A.2d at 1178. Marriage is a joint enterprise, the court reasoned, which depends on "the
conjunction of multiple components, only one of which is financial." Id. at 113, 415 A.2d at
1177.
In a recent New York case, Roussos v. Roussos, 106 Misc. 2d 583, 434 N.Y.S.2d 600
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1980), the husband complained that the wife's extensive request
for production of documents was unduly burdensome. Upholding the wife's demands, the
court noted that under the statute it had broad powers to delineate the extent of "marital
property" to uncover hidden assets, to discover possible waste, and in general to gather
information which may be pertinent to an equitable distribution. Id. at 585, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
602. See also Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 319, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584, 592 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1981) (wife who owned her own business entitled to only 25% of hus-
band's one-half interest in a clinic where she expended minimal efforts in its founding).
140 See notes 141-154 and accompanying text infra.
141 See note 49 supra.
142 Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63, 413 A.2d 854, 857 (1979); see LaBella
v. LaBella, 134 Conn. 312, 318, 57 A.2d 627, 629 (1948). In Jacobsen, the court noted that
when dealing with domestic relations "all of the surrounding circumstances and the appear-
ance and attitude of the parties are . . . significant; the trial court, therefore, has broad
discretion." 177 Conn. at 262-63, 413 A.2d at 857.
14s Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 584, 362 A.2d 835, 838 (1975); DiPalma
v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 298, 303 A.2d 709, 712 (1972); E. M. Loew's Enterprises, Inc. v.
Surabian, 146 Conn. 608, 611, 153 A.2d 463, 465 (1959).
144 See Krause v. Krause, 174 Conn. 361, 364, 387 A.2d 548, 549 (1978). In Krause, the
husband was appealing the trial court's dissolution of the marriage, contending that the trial
court had erroneously failed to consider all of the factors outlined in the statute. The Su-
preme Court of Connecticut, however, affirmed, holding that the lower court's memorandum
of decision clearly indicated a full consideration of all the statutory criteria. Id.
145 Id.
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though the wife's complaint did not include a claim for such a
conveyance."46
New Jersey has adopted a similar view. Again, trial judges
have a considerable degree of discretion because of the absence of
statutory guidelines. 47 Since New Jersey possesses a far more ex-
tensive body of case law, more definitive limitations have been
placed on the exercise of judicial discretion.'4" The polarity of dis-
tributions which will inevitably result when allowance is made for
judicial discretion may be illustrated by a comparison of two cases.
One court ordered a wife to convey her half-interest in the marital
residence, finding that it would be "inequitable, unjust and uncon-
scionable to distribute or award any interest in the marital abode
to the wife" under the circumstances. 149 Another court compen-
sated a wife for contributions to the financial success of her hus-
band, reasoning that "[e]ven a sparring partner can be said to con-
tribute in some measure to the success of an adversary.' ' 50
Desiring to avoid what they perceived to be unbridled judicial
discretion elsewhere, the New York legislature granted more lim-
ited discretion to trial judges.' 5' New York's statute enumerates
the criteria upon which a judicial decision must be based and re-
"46 See McKay v. McKay, 174 Conn. 1, 2, 381 A.2d 527, 528 (1977).
147 The New Jersey statute provides in pertinent part:
[T]he court may make such award or awards to the parties . . . to effectuate an
equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was ... ac-
quired by them or either of them during the marriage. However, all such prop-
erty . .. acquired during the marriage by either party by way of gift, devise or
bequest shall not be subject to equitable distribution, except that interspousal
gifts shall be subject to equitable distribution.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1980).
148 See notes 149-150 and accompanying text infra.
1 Sanders v. Sanders, 118 N.J. Super. 327, 331, 287 A.2d 464, 466 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1972). In divesting the wife of all right, title, and interest in the marital abode, the Sanders
court considered the following facts: the residence was acquired and maintained solely by
the husband, the disparate ages of the parties, the wife's upcoming remarriage, the hus-
band's failing health, and the wife's refusal to have sexual relations with the husband or
perform any of her wifely duties for the greater part of the marriage. Upholding the wife's
claim to one-half of the residence, the court reasoned, would "violate the whole concept of
tenancy by the entirety as a protection of the parties to a marriage." Id. at 330, 287 A.2d at
465-66.
150 Scherzer v. Scherer, 136 N.J. Super. 397, 401, 346 A.2d 434, 436 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975). Although the marriage had been acrimonious from its inception, the Scherzer
court found that the wife had made some effort to make the relationship viable. Moreover,
the court stated that even if the wife were "responsible in considerable part for the antago-
nistic marriage relationship, that factor alone should not bar her from sharing in the marital
assets." Id.
1l See Foster & Freed, Family Law, supra note 11, at 357.
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quires the court to make a written report outlining the factors
which it considered in making its decision.152 Nevertheless, case
law recognizes that discretion is to play a prominent role. In deny-
ing a jury trial for issues concerning the division of marital prop-
erty, custody, maintenance and support, one court held that equi-
table distribution "is clear and unequivocal-the intent of the
statute is to deal with the equitable rights of the parties." 115 Exam-
ining the legislative history of the statute, the court concluded that
equity would allow the court the discretion to fashion a remedy to
fit the particular circumstances of the case.'
MAINTNANCE
The Diminished Role of Fault
Traditionally, alimony was awarded on a permanent basis to
the wife, provided she was not guilty of misconduct entitling the
husband to a judgment of divorce or separation.15 5 New York's eq-
uitable distribution law, however, envisages alimony as "mainte-
nance"-a flexible concept designed to meet the reasonable needs
of the party requiring support regardless of that party's gender.158
The New York statute permits the court to direct one spouse
to pay maintenance to the other on a temporary or permanent ba-
sis "in such amount as justice requires, having regard for the cir-
cumstances of the case and of the respective parties."157 The court
is guided by nine specific criteria including, inter alia, the income
182 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); note 11
supra.
15 Mandel v. Mandel, 109 Misc. 2d 1, 3, 439 N.Y.S.2d 576, 577 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1981).
1 Id. at 4, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
188 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 60 Misc. 2d 692, 693-94, 309 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (Farn. Ct.
6 ntario County 1969) (wife has no right to alimony where divorce granted to husband was
premised on wife's misconduct); Boate v. Boate, 114 Misc. 321, 324, 187 N.Y.S. 321, 323
(N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. Kings County), aff'd, 115 Misc. 689, 190 N.Y.S. 914 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d
Dep't 1921) (where husband procured divorce decree because of wife's adultery, his obliga-
tion to support her terminated); Roth v. Roth, 77 Misc. 673, 676, 138 N.Y.S. 573, 576
(Oneida County Ct. 1912) (adultery of wife is a defense to her action to recover payment
due under separation agreement); cf. Hessen v. Hessen, 33 N.Y.2d 406, 412, 308 N.E.2d 891,
895, 353 N.Y.S.2d 421, 427 (1974) (recognizing that loss of right to alimony by wife because
of misconduct should be a factor in determining her husband's action for divorce).
'56 The term "maintenance" replaced the term "alimony" in an effort to establish a new
concept of support and distribution of property. See Memorandum of Assemblyman Bur-
rows, reprinted in [1980] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 129.
157 N.Y. DoM. RuL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
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and property of both parties, the waste of family assets by a
spouse, the tax consequences to each spouse, and a tenth provision
which encompasses "any other factor which the court shall ex-
pressly find to be just and proper." 158 Thus, while economic fault is
mentioned specifically, traditional fault, which precluded an award
of alimony under prior law, apparently may now be considered in
the discretion of the court under the catch-all provision.159 Indeed,
one New York court recently held that marital fault may even pre-
clude an award of maintenance in an appropriate case.16 0 Noting
that the legislature did not accord any particular weight to the var-
ious statutory criteria used in determining maintenance, the court
reasoned that a disallowance based upon marital fault would be
permissible in certain situations."'1 Hopefully, any abuse of discre-
tion will be curbed by the statutory provision mandating that the
1-0 Id. § 236(B)(6)(a)(10).
159 The traditional role of fault was outlined in Taylor v. Taylor, 105 Misc. 2d 998, 430
N.Y.S.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. Orleans County 1980), wherein the court awarded maintenance to a
wife although she committed adultery after being abandoned by her husband. Id. at 1000,
430 N.Y.S.2d at 31. Justice Mattina stated that "it is this court's opinion that the newly
enacted matrimonial law amending section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law dispenses
with misconduct as a bar to alimony relief." Id. at 999, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 31. The court noted
that maintenance would be determined based on the statutory criteria and that while the
wife's misconduct could conceivably be considered in the catch-all provision, it would be but
one of the factors to be weighed. Id. at 1000, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 31. Similarly, in Deschamps v.
Deschamps, 103 Misc. 2d, 678, 430 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980), the
changed role of marital fault was recognized. Id. at 682, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 968. The Des-
champs court thwarted a plaintiff-wife's attempt to avoid a defense of marital misconduct
by denying her motion to recommence her action under the new statute. Id. The court noted
that the new 236(B)(6) did not specifically mention fault "except to the extent that fault
might be construed under certain circumstances as a factor under clauses (9) and (10)
thereof." Id.
While fault will be considered in the "catch all provision," see Foster, Commentary on
Equitable Distribution, supra note 6, at 59; Note, supra note 49, at 93, its role may be
minimal in view of the former law's express denial of alimony to the wife on grounds of
marital misconduct and the new law's omission of fault.
160 Giannola v. Giannola, 109 Misc. 2d 985, 986, 441 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1981). Although the court did not delineate what would constitute an "appropriate
situation" justifying a denial of maintenance because of marital fault, it did note that the
financial conditions of the parties must be examined and that the denial must not cause the
spouse to become a public charge. Id. An equitable distribution of the marital property,
however, may not be precluded because of marital fault. Id.
161 Id. It should be noted that the role of marital fault in determining maintenance was
a major stumbling block in enacting the new section 236. Numerous legislators and commit-
tee members had demanded that marital fault be expressly included as a factor, but a com-
promise was reached whereby marital fault could be considered as a "factor which the court
[may] expressly find to be just and proper." See Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distri-
bution, supra note 6, at 49.
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court enumerate the factors considered and state its rationale for
determining the award of maintenance.162
In Connecticut, the statute also provides criteria for determin-
ing an alimony award. 163 Under case law, the award will be upheld
unless an abuse of discretion can be shown.6 In contrast to New
York, however, the Connecticut statute specifically authorizes the
court to consider the causes of the marital dissolution-a tradi-
tional fault concept. 65 Although case law dictates that alimony be
viewed presumptively as support and not as punishment imposed
upon a guilty spouse, 166 several cases have held that an unjustified
162 The New York statute directs the court to identify both the factors considered and
the reasons underlying the decision. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982). This requirement may not be waived by either party or counsel. Id. Also
applicable to the equitable distribution of marital property, see N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(5)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1981), this identification stipulation was the result of a com-
promise among members of the Matrimonial Law Committee of the New York County Law-
yer's Association, other bar groups, and members of the legislature who disagreed over the
degree of judicial discretion permissible in fashioning an equitable distribution of marital
property and determining maintenance. See Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribu-
tion, supra note 6, at 51. The bill proposed by Senator Barclay and Assemblyman Furrows
favored the "judicial discretion approach"-leaving it to the court to decide what percent-
age is equitable. The other bill, introduced by Senator Winikow and Assemblywoman New-
burger, presumed that marriage is an equal partnership, mandating that the court utilize a
50-50 presumption. Sassower, supra note 7, § 11, at 18, col. 1 (Westchester opinion). The
compromise resulted in a set of statutory guidelines and a requirement that the trial judge
state the factors and reasons for his determination. See Foster, Commentary on Equitable
Distribution, supra note 6, at 51.
'" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1981). The factors to be considered by the court in-
clude the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage
or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, voca-
tional skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any,
which the court may make as a property settlement. In the case of a parent to whom the
custody of minor children has been awarded, the court also determines the desirability of
the custodial parent securing employment. Id. § 46b-82.
I" See Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 626, 427 A.2d 432, 434 (1980) (denial of hus-
band's motion for new trial on ground that denial of such a motion rests in discretion of the
trial court, reviewable only in case of abuse); Krieble v. Krieble, 168 Conn. 7, 7, 357 A.2d
475, 476 (1975) (decisive issue .on appeal of alimony award is whether trial court abused
discretion); Baker v. Baker, 166 Conn. 476, 488, 352 A.2d 277, 284 (1974) (amount of ali-
mony awarded is within sound discretion of trial court because of significant advantages
that trial courts possess in cases dealing with domestic relations).
165 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(c) (1981).
1 While the Connecticut statute specifically allows consideration of marital fault in
determining an alimony award, the case law has assessed alimony primarily on the basis of
the support needs of the spouse. See Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn. 742, 748, 345 A.2d 21, 25
(1974); Hotkowski v. Hotkowski, 165 Conn. 167, 170, 328 A.2d 674, 676 (1973); Stoner v.
Stoner, 163 Conn. 345, 354, 307 A.2d 146, 152-53 (1972) (primary basis for alimony award is
the continuing legal duty of a divorced husband to support his wife).
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separation is a defense to the support obligation.167
New Jersey's alimony statute is relatively brief and merely di-
rects the court to consider the duration of the marriage and the
need and ability of the parties to pay alimony.16 8 Any award must
be "fit, reasonable and just. ' 169 Additionally, New Jersey courts
have been active in delineating the criteria to be considered in
making an alimony award.1 0 Although fault is a factor which may
be considered in awarding alimony upon a divorce, the more recent
trend has been to minimize its role. 1
M6 In Edge v. Commissioner of Welfare, 34 Conn. Supp. 284, 388 A.2d 1193, 1194 (C.P.
1978), the court held that an otherwise legally liable husband was not required under sec-
tion 17-82e of the General Statutes to reimburse the state for support payments made to his
wife where she left the husband without any fault on his part and where she obviously
engaged in adultery leading to the birth of another man's child. See Cantiello v. Cantiello,
136 Conn. 685, 690, 74 A.2d 199, 202 (1950); Rucci v. Rucci, 23 Conn. Supp. 221, 181 A.2d
125, 127 (Super. Ct. 1962).
IS N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981).
169 Id.
170 Greenberg v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. Super. 96, 100, 312 A.2d 878, 880 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1973), enunciates six factors to consider when making an award of alimony: the actual
needs of the wife, the husband's actual means and his ability to pay support, the physical
condition of the parties, their social position, the separate property and income of the wife
and any other factors which bear on fair and reasonable support. Id.
The award of alimony is closely tied to the factors considered in making an equitable
distribution of marital property. The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that when a
case is remanded for reconsideration of equitable distribution, the alimony judgment will be
reopened for review. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 349, 331 A.2d 257, 262 (1975); Rothman v.
Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 233-34, 320 A.2d 496, 504 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J.
196, 217-18, 320 A.2d 484, 495-96 (1974).
Moreover, one of the factors in determining an equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty is the " 'effect of distribution of assets on the ability to pay alimony.'" 65 N.J. at 211,
320 A.2d at 492. Any minor change in the value of the marital assets eligible for equitable
distribution between the date of the separation agreement and the date of the divorce de-
cree may be reflected in the amount of alimony awardel and not in the equitable distribu-
tion of the assets. Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 362, 371 A.2d 1, 7 (1977); Borodinsky v.
Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 447, 393 A.2d 583, 588-89 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
M The New Jersey statute allows consideration of marital fault in determining an ali-
mony award. The statute states that "[i]n all actions for divorce other than those where
judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation the court may consider also the
proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or mainte-
nance that is fit, reasonable and just." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981). New
Jersey case law, however, has refined the effect of marital fault on alimony awards. Two
years after the enactment of New Jersey's statute, the Superior Court of New Jersey held
that the lower trial court could not increase an award of alimony based upon the marital
fault of the husband. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. Super. 96, 99, 312 A.2d 878, 880
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). The court stated that while marital wrongs were grounds for
breaking the marital bond, the legislature did not intend that alimony be awarded as a
punitive device. Id. at 100, 312 A.2d at 880. Justice Crahay stated that in enacting the stat-
ute, "the Legislature merely meant that trial courts might consider the proofs to support a
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The Marital Standard of Living
While both New Jersey and Connecticut case law require a
consideration of the marital standard of living in determining ali-
mony,"'2 the New York statute qualifies the criterion by adding the
matrimonial cause of action when it turned to the issue of alimony and support assessment.
Examples thereof would include the length of marriage, the mental and physical health of
the aggrieved spouse, the mode of living which the parties enjoyed, and the like." Id.
In contrast, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has taken the position that marital fault
would be a proper consideration in dealing with alimony although it was irrelevant for equi-
table distribution purposes. Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 193, 194 n.4, 320 A.2d 478,
481, 482 n.4 (1974). Subsequently, the appellate division of the superior court startled the
matrimonial bar with language intimating that a wife's adultery was always a bar to an
award of alimony. Mahne v. Mahne, 147 N.J. Super. 326, 328-29, 371 A.2d 314, 315 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1977); see Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 336, 398 A.2d 141, 144 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979). This broad statement was tempered, however, in Nochenson v. Nochen-
son, 148 N.J. Super. 448, 449-50, 372 A.2d 1139, 1140 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), wherein
the same court determined that marital fault would only be a permissible factor to consider
in granting or denying alimony. See Smith v. Smith, 150 N.J. Super. 194, 196, 375 A.2d 290,
291 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
In Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 398 A.2d 141 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), the
court stated that " 'a paramount reason' for alimony is 'to permit a wife to share in the
economic rewards occasioned by her husband's income level . . . reached as a result of their
combined labors, inside and outside the home.' "Id. at 337, 398 A.2d at 145; see Gugliotta v.
Gugliotta, 160 N.J. Super. 160, 164, 388 A.2d 1338, 1340 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978). While
the Lynn court recognized that outrageous marital fault precipitating the dissolution of the
marriage might justify barring alimony to the guilty spouse, the court held that an adulter-
ous act committed after desertion by the husband did not constitute outrageous marital
conduct. 165 N.J. Super. at 335, 398 A.2d at 144.
Fault as a consideration in an application for alimony upon the final judgment of di-
vorce should be distinguished from the consideration of fault in an application for alimony
pendente lite. Fault may not defeat pendente lite application for alimony. Smith v. Smith,
150 N.J. Super. 194, 196-97, 375 A.2d 290, 291 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
172 See Ross v. Ross, 172 Conn. 269, 273, 374 A.2d 185, 187 (1977); Whitney v. Whitney,
171 Conn. 23, 27-28, 368 A.2d 96, 100 (1976); Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 150, 416 A.2d 45,
52 (1980); Capodanno v. Capodanno, 58 N.J. 113, 118, 275 A.2d 441, 443 (1971); Gugliotta v.
Gugliotta, 164 N.J. Super. 139, 141, 395 A.2d 901, 902 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Green-
berg v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. Super. 96, 100, 312 A.2d 878, 880 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973);
Weiner v. Weiner, 120 N.J. Super. 36, 41, 293 A.2d 229, 232 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972). In
determining alimony awards neither the New Jersey nor the Connecticut statute refer to the
marital standard of living. Reference is made in the Connecticut statute, however, to "sta-
tion, occupation, amount and sources of income." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-82 (1981), and
Connecticut case law indicate that both parties' standard of living during and after the mar-
riage are factors in determining alimony. See Whitney v. Whitney, 171 Conn. 23, 27-28, 368
A.2d 96, 100 (1976). Under the New Jersey statute, courts are directed to award "an amount
of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West Supp. 1981). New Jersey case law continues to follow the traditional view that the
standard of living to which a spouse has become accustomed should be the determinative
criteria used in an alimony award. See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 150, 416 A.2d 45, 52
(Sup. Ct. 1980); Weiner v. Weiner, 120 N.J. Super. 36, 41, 293 A.2d 229, 232 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1972). This view was criticized, however, as being incongruous with contemporary soci-
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phrase "where practical and relevant." 173 Although New York
courts have not yet defined what circumstances warrant a consid-
eration of the marital standard of living,17 4 it may now be more
difficult for a spouse to demand maintenance payments to support
a luxurious lifestyle. Indeed, the burden of proving the relevance of
the standard of living may be placed upon the party asserting it as
a consideration.
Rehabilitative Alimony
When awarding alimony, New York courts must now consider
any period of education or training which may be necessary to en-
able a party to become self-supporting.175 This progressive concept
of rehabilitative alimony has been recognized by an increasing
number of jurisdictions.17 It is predicated on the theory that
maintenance should be a temporary measure except in cases where
age, health, or other factors favor permanent support. 77
New Jersey has incorporated rehabilitative alimony into its
decisional law. In Turner v. Turner, the court defined rehabilita-
tive alimony as "alimony payable for a short, but specific and ter-
ety. Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 315-19, 385 A.2d 1280, 1281-83 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1978).
173 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
174 New York cases construing the former section 236 permitted a consideration of the
marital standard of living in awarding alimony to a spouse. See, e.g., Hickland v. Hickland,
39 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 346 N.E.2d 243, 245-46, 382 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941
(1976); Kay v. Kay, 37 N.Y.2d 632, 637, 399 N.E.2d 143, 147, 376 N.Y.S.2d 443, 447-48
(1975); Shanahan v. Shanahan, 80 App. Div. 2d 738, 739, 437 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170 (4th Dep't
1981); Armiento v. Armiento, 67 App. Div. 2d 661, 661, 412 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (2d Dep't 1979);
Fisher v. Fisher, 56 App. Div. 2d 547, 547, 391 N.Y.S.2d 598, 598 (1st Dep't 1977).
171 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
7' See, e.g., Porreca v. Porreca, 8 Ariz. App. 394, 397, 446 P.2d 500, 503 (Ct. App.
1968); Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Otis v. Otis,
299 N.W.2d 114, 116-17 (Minn. 1980); In re Grove, 280 Or. 341, 358, 571 P.2d 477, 482,
modified on other grounds, 280 Or. 369, 572 P.2d 1320 (1977); Suther v. Suther, 28 Wash.
App. 838, 627 P.2d 110, 114 (Ct. App. 1981); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(6) (West Supp. 1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(e) (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552(2)(b) (West
Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(c)(H) (1979); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
26.09.090(1)(b) (West Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26(5) (West 1981).
177 See McAnerney & Schoonmaker HI, Connecticut's New Approach to Marriage Dis-
solution, 47 CONN. B.J. 375, 393 (1973); Comment, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In
Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F.L.
REV. 493, 494-97, 517-18 (1978). Rehabilitative alimony is "designed to return the heretofore
economically dependent spouse into the mainstream of society as a self-functioning, eco-
nomically self-sufficient unit." Gillman, Alimony/Spousal Support: From Punishment to
Rehabilitation, 7 COMM. PROP. J. 135, 138 (1980).
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minable period of time, which will cease when the recipient is, in
the exercise of reasonable efforts, in a position of self-support. '1 8
Reasoning that rehabilitative alimony was not prohibited by stat-
ute or case law,17 9 the Turner court awarded the wife alimony for
18 months.180 At the completion of that time, the court stated that
the wife would be in a financial position to satisfy her needs ade-
quately and maintain her accustomed standard of living.181
In contrast, the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected rehabili-
tative alimony in Grinold v. Grinold, characterizing it as a "novel
and elusive concept.' 1 82 In Grinold, the lower court had granted
the husband's motion to modify alimony since the wife was "sub-
stantially rehabilitated from any adverse socio-economic conse-
quence of her marriage."o83 Arguably, however, the supreme court's
reversal was grounded on the lower court's failure to make findings
of any change in financial or other circumstances which would have
supported a determination of rehabilitation.1 84
178 158 N.J. Super. 313, 314, 385 A.2d 1280, 1280-81 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
179 Id. at 323, 385 A.2d at 1285. But see Arnold v. Arnold, 167 N.J. Super. 478, 481-82,
401 A.2d 261, 263 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979). The Arnold court criticized an award of
rehabilitative alimony, noting that an advanced determination that alimony shall cease be-
cause of the passage of an arbitrary period of time is an a fortiori frustration of established
principles relating to alimony and its modification for change of circumstances. Id. at 480,
401 A.2d at 262.
1 158 N.J. Super. at 324, 385 A.2d at 1285-86.
181 Id. at 325, 385 A.2d at 1286. The concept of rehabilitative alimony has been en-
dorsed by the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Matrimonial Litigation. See
N.J.L.J., July 16, 1981, Supp. at 14, col. 1. The Committee stressed that such an award
should be discretionary and subject to subsequent modification, if necessary. Id.
The final report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Matrimonial Litiga-
tion was released recently. See Supreme Court Committee on Matrimonial Litigation:
Phase Two, Final Report, N.J.L.J., July 16, 1981, Supp. at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Pashman Committee Report]. The Pashman Committee Report addressed issues of matri-
monial procedure, child custody, litigant representation, enforcement of matrimonial orders
and judgments, rehabilitative alimony and the establishment of a family court. Although the
Committee's primary concern was the reformation of matrimonial procedure to achieve a
balance between judicial discretion, uniformity and predictability, see id. col. 2, its report
also marks a new philosophy towards child custody proceedings by endorsing the concept of
joint custody. Id. at 8, col. 2 & at 9, col. 1. Additionally, the noncustodial parent should be
able to participate to a greater extent in decisions affecting the child. Id.
182 172 Conn. 192, 195, 374 A.2d 172, 174 (1976). See also Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177
Conn. 259, 265 & n.2, 413 A.2d 854, 858 & n.2 (1979); Friedly v. Friedly, 174 Conn. 279, 282,
386 A.2d 236, 238 (1978).
183 172 Conn. at 193, 374 A.2d at 173.
18 See id. at 196, 374 A.2d at 174. The Grinold court noted that "[a] change in
financial circumstances was the sole basis of the defendant's motion to modify. The [lower]
court found no showing of such a situation, nor is there a finding concerning any other
substantially changed circumstance which would clarify and support the court's conclusions
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Modification of Alimony Awards
New York courts may modify maintenance awards which were
part of a separation agreement which merged into a divorce decree
"upon a showing of the recipient's inability to be self-supporting or
a substantial change in circumstance, including financial hard-
ship. ' 185 Basically, the changed circumstances standard comports
with prior law. 8 ' The alternative showing that a party is self-sup-
porting may result in a more liberal allowance of alimony modifica-
tion. Additionally, the New York courts now may modify a mainte-
nance award even though it was made pursuant to a separation
agreement which survived the divorce decree.1 87 This provision
regarding 'rehabilitation' as a ground for modification." Id.
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
See, e.g., Kover v. Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408, 413-14, 418, 278 N.E.2d 886, 887-88, 890,
328 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643-45, 647 (1972); Hickland v. Hickland, 56 App. Div. 2d 978, 979, 393
N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (3d Dep't 1977); Canfield v. Canfield, 55 App. Div. 2d 694, 694, 389
N.Y.S.2d 52, 53-54 (3d Dep't 1976); cf. Wlodarek v. Wlodarek, 78 App. Div. 2d 981, 981, 433
N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (4th Dep't 1980) (oral stipulation of opposing counsel); Adrien v. Adrien,
65 App. Div. 2d 931, 932, 410 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 (4th Dep't 1978) (enforcement of foreign
judgment). Some of the changed circumstances which have resulted in the downward modi-
fication of alimony under the predecessor statute include the loss of overtime salary, Toliver
v. Toliver, 67 App. Div. 2d 971, 972, 413 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (2d Dep't 1979), the loss of job
and dependence on military pension and unemployment insurance, Wlodarek v. Wlodarek,
78 App. Div. 2d 981, 981, 433 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (4th Dep't 1980), and an illness causing
gross change in the spouse's financial situation, Klein v. Klein, 55 App. Div. 2d 885, 886, 391
N.Y.S.2d 7, 7 (1st Dep't 1977). Upward modification has been permitted when illness pre-
vented the spouse receiving alimony from working. Wantuch v. Wantuch, 56 App. Div. 2d
866, 867, 392 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335 (2d Dep't 1977). Modification was not allowed, however,
when the husband's income remained unchanged. See Adrien v. Adrien, 65 App. Div. 2d
931, 932, 410 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 (4th Dep't 1978); Kurtz v. Kurtz, 58 App. Div. 2d 1006,
1006, 396 N.Y.S.2d 952, 953 (2d Dep't 1977); Hickland v. Hickland, 56 App. Div. 2d 978,
979, 393 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (3d Dep't 1977).
While a decree of child support may be modified on the same grounds as maintenance,
subdivision 9(b) of Part B of the new section 236 does apply to a distributive award. See
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). This is logical in light of
the purpose of distributive awards. Such awards are in the nature of property settlements
based on the parties' holdings during the marriage. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (B)(5)(e)
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). See generally Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribu-
tion, supra note 6, at 7-11. Additionally, modification will not be allowed for any sums due
which have been reduced to final judgment. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982).
187 See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). New York
now comports with the majority of states which allow modification of maintenance provided
for by a separation agreement which survives or is incorporated into the divorce decree. See,
e.g., Hutton v. Hutton, 284 Ala. 91, 95, 222 So. 2d 348, 351 (1969); Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24
Ariz. App. 447, 450, 539 P.2d 921, 924 (Ct. App. 1975); Levitt v. Levitt, 62 Cal. 2d 477, 481-
82, 399 P.2d 33, 36, 42 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580 (1965); Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 386-87,
462 P.2d 49, 51 (1969); Smith v. Smith, 358 Mass. 551, 553, 265 N.E.2d 858, 859 (1971);
19821
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radically changes prior law which had precluded the court from
"rewriting" an agreement which survived divorce. 188 Furthermore,
the statute requires a showing of "extreme hardship" but, if this
burden is met, the modified decree will supersede the separation
agreement.189
To modify an alimony award, a "substantial change" in cir-
cumstances is mandated under the Connecticut statute.190 Subse-
quent cases have expanded this concept and have required that the
change be one that was not contemplated by the parties at the
time the original decree was entered.191 When deciding whether to
Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 107-08, 506 P.2d 719, 721-22 (1973); Kinne v. Kinne, 82
Wash. 360, 362, 510 P.2d 814, 815-16 (1973). See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOmESTic
RELATIONS 452-53 (1968). Subsection 9(b), however, does not refer to modification of a sepa-
ration agreement which provides for child support. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Thus, there is no change in prior New York case law dealing
with modification of child support agreements. See Boden v. Boden, 42 N.Y.2d 210, 212-13,
366 N.E.2d 791, 794, 397 N.Y.S.2d 701, 703-04 (1977). In Boden, the court of appeals held
that a fair and equitable separation agreement dealing with child support should not be
disturbed absent "unanticipated and reasonable change in circumstances." Id. at 213, 366
N.E.2d at 794, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 703. It has been suggested that modification of child support
provisions was omitted to avoid conflict with the Boden decision. Foster & Freed, Family
Law, supra note 11, at 363 & n.71.
"I See, e.g., McMains v. McMains, 15 N.Y.2d 283, 284-85, 206 N.E.2d 185, 186-87, 258
N.Y.S.2d 93, 94-95 (1965); Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 299-300, 26 N.E.2d 265, 266-
67 (1940); Farber v. Farber, 25 App. Div. 2d 850, 850, 269 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (2d Dep't 1966);
Adams v. Adams, 66 Misc. 2d 378, 380, 320 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1971). By allowing a surviving separation agreement to be rewritten and superseded by a
subsequent maintenance modification, the statute succeeds in correcting an inequitable and
gender discriminatory situation which had been created by New York case law. Under prior
New York law, if the separation agreement survived the divorce, the former wife could in-
voke the state's power to increase her alimony award as "justice requires," based on the
concept that the former husband had an obligation to support his wife adequately. More-
over, any agreement relieving the former husband of his obligation was void. Yet, the sepa-
ration agreement could not be modified based on a change in the husband's circumstances.
See Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 300, 26 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1940); cf. McMains v.
McMains, 15 N.Y.2d 283, 287, 206 N.E.2d 185, 186-87, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93, 98 (1965) (continu-
ing duty of husband cannot be escaped by reliance on any contract).
See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
100 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-86(a) (1981); see McGuiness v. McGuiness, 43 CONN. L.J. 3
(Sup. Ct. July 21, 1981). The statute was amended in 1978 to allow the court to modify the
payment of periodic alimony in actions for divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation,
or annulment upon a showing that the party receiving the alimony is living with another
person under circumstances which have altered the financial needs of the recipient. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-86(b) (1981); see Kaplan v. Kaplan, 43 CONN. L.J. 3 (Sup. Ct. July 21,
1981).
"I See Swayze v. Swayze, 176 Conn. 323, 337, 408 A.2d 1, 8 (1978); Friedly v. Friedly,
174 Conn. 279, 280, 386 A.2d 236, 237 (1978); Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 378
A.2d 522, 527 (1977). Connecticut's statute has been judicially construed to disallow a retro-
active modification of alimony. Id. at 407, 378 A.2d at 526-27.
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permit a modification, courts will consider the same type of cir-
cumstances that were relevant in making the original award of
alimony. 92
By case law, New Jersey requires a showing of changed cir-
cumstances before a modification of alimony will be ordered.193 In
Lepis v. Lepis, the court listed factors constituting changed cir-
cumstances and held that the party seeking modification must
demonstrate that the change has substantially impaired his ability
to support himself." Unlike Connecticut, however, the party re-
questing modification is not limited to demonstrating the occur-
rence of events which were unforeseeable at the time of the
divorce. 195
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Property settlement agreements have become increasingly
prevalent as a method of resolving disputes regarding marital
property. Presently, the scope of permissible contractual arrange-
ments is greater than that allowed by common law. Parties may
"contract out" of equitable distribution and even establish the
amount and duration of maintenance.
The New York statute specifies that an agreement must be
fair and reasonable when made and not unconscionable when the
192 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-82 (1981). In ruling on a modification, the court should
consider the needs and financial resources of the parties, including their income, age, health,
earning capacity, and value of their estates. See McGuinness v. McGuinness, 43 CONN. L.J. 3
(Sup. Ct. July 21, 1981); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 264, 413 A.2d 854, 858 (1979);
Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 402, 378 A.2d 522, 525 (1977); England v. England,
138 Conn. 410, 414, 85 A.2d 483, 485 (1951).
193 See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146, 416 A.2d 45, 48 (1980); Berkowitz v.
Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 569-70, 264 A.2d 49, 52 (1970); Winter v. Winter, 162 N.J. Super.
456, 461, 393 A.2d 593, 595 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); DiTolvo v. DiTolvo, 131 N.J. Super.
72, 76, 328 A.2d 625, 627 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); McDermott v. McDermott, 120 N.J.
Super. 42, 44, 293 A.2d 232, 233 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972). See generally Note, Modifica-
tion of Spousal Support: A Survey of a Confusing Area of the Law, 17 J. FAM. L. 711, 728-
40 (1979).
194 83 N.J. 139, 150-53, 416 A.2d 45, 51-52 (1980). The Lepis court enumerated several
factual settings in which New Jersey courts have found changed circumstances warranting
modification, including an increase in the cost of living, an increase or decrease in the sup-
porting spouse's income, illness, disability or infirmity arising after the original judgment,
the dependent spouse's loss of a house or apartment, the dependent spouse's cohabitation
with another, subsequent employment by the dependent spouse, and changes in federal in-
come tax law. Id. at 151, 416 A.2d at 51 (citations omitted).
'"1 Id. at 152-53, 416 A.2d at 52. The Lepis court held that the dependent spouse had a
continuing right to maintain the standard of living which was reflected in the separation
agreement or decree, rather than on the foreseeability of any change in circumstances. Id.
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judgment is entered.19 A novel addition to New York's divorce
law, this provision enables parties to enter into agreements both
before and during the marriage 97 governing inheritance rights, the
ownership or distribution of marital or separate property, the
amount and duration of alimony, and the care, custody, and main-
tenance of children. 9 8
In Connecticut, pursuant to the statute, agreements concern-
ing custody, support, alimony, or disposition of property will be
examined by the court to determine whether the agreement is "fair
and equitable."1'9 Factors to be considered by the court include
the financial resources and needs of the parties and, where applica-
ble, their fitness to have custody or enjoy visitation rights with
children.200 If the agreement is written and is "fair and equitable"
190 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Upon a strict read-
ing of the statute, the requirement that an agreement be fair, reasonable, and not uncon-
scionable applies only to agreements concerning spousal maintenance, and not those con-
cerning child support, custody, division of property, and inheritance rights. See id. The
legislature, however, could not have intended such an anomalous result. Foster & Freed,
Family Law, supra note 11, at 347. Even if the statute is strictly construed, "the contro-
versy at most is a tempest in a teapot" since general contractual and equitable principles
would pxevent a court from enforcing any agreement which was unfair and unreasonable
when made or unconscionable at the entry of judgment. Id. See generally 14 S. WLLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1628, at 6 (3d ed. 1972).
197 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). A property settle-
ment and support agreement is valid unless it attempts to alter or dissolve the marital rela-
tionship or relieves either spouse of his duty to support the other in instances where a
spouse would require public assistance. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311 (McKinney Supp.
1981-1982). Allowing agreements which alter the support duty between spouses marks a
drastic departure from previous New York law. Compare General Obligations Law, ch. 254,
§ 12, [1966] N.Y. Laws 842 (repealed 1980) with N.Y. GEN. OBLrn. LAW § 5-311 (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982). Under prior law, agreements which relieved or altered the husband of his
legal obligation to support his spouse were considered void. See, e.g., McMains v. McMains,
15 N.Y.2d 283, 285, 206 N.E.2d 185, 187, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95 (1965); Lacks v. Lacks, 12
N.Y.2d 268, 271, 189 N.E.2d 487, 488, 238 N.Y.S.2d 949, 950 (1963); Slocum v. Slocum, 42
App. Div. 2d 56, 57, 345 N.Y.S.2d 188, 190 (3d Dep't 1973); Pellman v. Pellman, 88 Misc. 2d
251, 253, 387 N.Y.S.2d 348, 350 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976); Colla-Negri v. Colla-Negri, 19
Misc. 2d 496, 497, 191 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959). Nevertheless, courts
were willing to recognize support agreements provided the "payments [were] regular, sub-
stantial and periodic, reflecting an understanding of a continuing obligation to support."
Marine Midland Bank v. Batson, 70 Misc. 2d 8, 11, 332 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972); accord, Belaustegui v. Belaustegui, 85 Misc. 2d 1015, 1020, 380 N.Y.S.2d 950,
955 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976).
"I N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The statute man-
dates that all agreements between spouses be "in writing, subscribed by the parties, and
acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded." Id.
'99 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-66 (1981); see Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 162 Conn. 147, 169,
362 A.2d 889, 892 (1975).
200 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-66, 46b-82 (1981); see Fricke v. Fricke, 174 Conn. 602, 602,
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under all the circumstances, the court will incorporate it into its
decree. 01
New Jersey's statute is silent on agreements. Consequently,
this area of the law has developed through case law. Despite their
initial refusal to specifically enforce such agreements, 20 2 New
Jersey courts subsequently recognized them to the extent that they
were "just and equitable. ' 20 3 This rule was refined further by the
Schiff decision in the early seventies.20 Schiff held that "a far
greater showing of changed circumstances must be made before the
court can modify a separation agreement than need be shown to
warrant the court amending an order for alimony or support. 205
Employing principles of contract law, the court required changed
circumstances sufficient "to convince the court that to enforce the
agreement would be unconscionable."20 This contractual view of
property settlement agreements, however, was abandoned in Smith
v. Smith, wherein the court held that alimony and child support
agreements should not be given greater deference than judicial de-
crees. 20 7 By deciding that contract principles were inapposite be-
cause marital agreements were not contracts in the traditional
392 A.2d 473, 474 (1978).
201 Id.; see Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 183, 413 A.2d 819, 825, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 801 (1979). See generally Schoonmaker & Balbirer, Survey of 1975 Developments in
Connecticut Family Law, 50 CoNN. B.J. 67, 79 (1976); Project, The Unauthorized Practice
of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 134-37 (1976). The
court has an affirmative obligation to determine whether a settlement agreement is fair and
equitable. Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. at 183, 413 A.2d at 825.
202 Apfelbaum v. Apfelbauim, 111 N.J. Eq. 529, 531, 162 A. 543, 544 (1932) (per curiam).
Apfelbaum was overruled in Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 581, 158 A.2d 508, 522
(1960). See, e.g., Aiosa v. Aiosa, 119 N.J. Eq. 385, 386-87, 183 A. 219, 220 (1936); Phillips v.
Phillips, 119 N.J. Eq. 462, 463, 183 A. 220, 221 (1936). In Apfelbaum, the court held that the
power to enforce a just agreement "grow[s] out of the existing or preexisting marital status,
and [is] not controlled by the rules of specific performance of contracts." Apfelbaum v. Ap-
felbaum, 111 N.J. Eq. at 531, 162 A. at 544.
203 See, e.g., Carlesen v. Carlesen, 72 N.J. 363, 370, 371 A.2d 8, 12 (1977); Smith v.
Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 358, 371 A.2d 1, 5 (1977); Hudson v. Hudson, 36 N.J. 549, 555, 178 A.2d
202, 205 (1962); Schlemn v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 581-82, 158 A.2d 508, 522 (1960); Wer-
tlake v. Wertlake, 137 N.J. Super. 476, 482, 349 A.2d 552, 555 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
204 Schiff v. Schiff, 116 N.J. Super. 546, 558-62, 283 A.2d 131, 137-39 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1971). o
205 Id. at 561, 283 A.2d at 139.
206 Id.
207 72 N.J. 350, 360, 371 A.2d 1, 6 (1977). When presented with a request for modifica-
tion of an agreement, the court should determine what is equitable under the circumstances.
Nonetheless, due weight should be accorded to the "strong public policy favoring stability of
arrangements." Id.
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sense, Lepis v. Lepis affirmed the view expressed in Smith."8
Thus, the court should use general equitable principles 2 9 and con-
sider such agreements as hybrid documents evidencing a willing-
ness on the part of the parties to resolve their differences.210 Ac-
cordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently held that
although an escalator clause including a decree-incorporated agree-
ment is not invalid per se,21' it will be modified or set aside if the
challenging spouse can prove that the terms of the agreement are
unfair and unjust under the circumstances.2 2 The court noted,
however, that escalator clauses are geared to one of the Lepis fac-
tors-change in net income of the obligated spouse-which would
ordinarily justify modification of child support and alimony. 213
CONCLUSION
With New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut now unified in
their approaches toward equitable distribution, the metropolitan
area practitioner may expect a greater degree of uniformity in the
distribution of marital assets upon divorce. While there will be dif-
ferences among the jurisdictions in their applications of equitable
distribution principles, this theoretical unity hopefully will allow
the development of an approach suited to the unique character of
the tristate area.
Indeed, such a development would be most welcome. Since the
three states have long shared a common history, geography, and
socio-economic composition, it appears logical to extend these re-
gional similarities to the equitable distribution of property. How to
formulate such a regional outlook while acknowledging each state's
individuality will be one of the major challenges confronting the
tristate judiciary in the years ahead.
208 Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 148-49, 416 A.2d 45, 49-50 (1980).
209 Id. at 148-49, 416 A.2d at 50.
210 Id. at 153-54, 416 A.2d at 52-53. The Lepis opinion was authored by Justice Pash-
man, the chairman of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Matrimonial Litigation.
See note 181 supra. The decision acknowledges that spousal agreements may ensure the
stability of support arrangements. 83 N.J. at 153-54, 416 A.2d at 52-53.
21 Petersen v.Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642, 428 A.2d 1301, 1303 (1981).
212 Id. at 644, 428 A.2d at 1304. The Petersen court stated that "to the extent that the
parties have developed comprehensive and particularized agreements responsive to their pe-
culiar circumstances, such arrangements will be entitled to judicial deference and greatly
assist the judiciary in the discharge of its supervisory role in such matters." Id. at 646, 428
A.2d at 1305.
213 Id. at 643, 428 A.2d at 1303.
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